Classification Guide Title/Number: Cuban Missile Crisis, 10-18

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2008-07-30
Pages: 5
Genre: guide
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Classification: SECRET
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

A 2008 NSA classification guide governing what may be disclosed about the agency's SIGINT activity during the Cuban Missile Crisis, showing that elements of 1960s collection against Cuba and the USSR were still controlled decades later.

Long Description:
No extended description available.
Programs:
-

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Cuba, Russia, Czech Republic, United States, Soviet Union

Tags:
classification guide, declassification, ELINT, direction finding, Cuban Missile Crisis, Cold War, historical SIGINT, diplomatic surveillance, records management

Identifier:
nsa-cuban-missile-crisis-classification-guide

PDF SHA-256:
9c790a024db4ea062e6a7850acb3f54d82cd10f1838e17f0be8ece89ee7e44f7

SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TITLE/NUMBER: Cuban Missile
Crisis, 10-18

(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 30 July 2008

(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Information Security Policy, DJP2

(U//FOUO) POC: DJP2

(U) PHONE:[REDACTED]

(U) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]
Associate Director for Community Integration, Policy and Records

(U) Unless otherwise indicated, the information included in this guide
addresses activity during and related to the Cuban Missile Crisis
ONLY.

Description of Information Classification/Markings Reason Declass Remarks
(U) The following guidance (items 1-8) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis during the time period 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963.
1. (U) The fact that the following entities were SIGINT targets during and related to the crisis:
a. The USSR
b. Soviet Forces in Cuba
c. Soviet Merchant Shipping
d. Cuba, to include Cuban Military Forces.
UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
2. (U) Information derived from, or pertaining to, unenciphered Soviet military communications during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
3. (U) Information derived from, or pertaining to, Soviet air-to-ground and ground-to-air GCI communications in Cuba during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
4. (U) Direction-finding results when applied to Cuban and Soviet Forces during and related to the crisis, to include merchant shipping involved in aid to Cuba. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
5. (U) Information derived from, UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A

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or pertaining to, unenciphered Cuban internal military and governmental communications during and related to the crisis.
6. (U) Information derived from or pertaining to Cuban air-to-ground and ground-to-air GCI communications during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
7. (U) Information derived from category IIX product reports pertaining to Soviet and Cuban communications during and related to the crisis, including Soviet Merchant Shipping communications. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
8. (U) Information derived from category II product reports pertaining to unenciphered Cuban internal military and governmental communications during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
(U) The following guidance (items 9-10) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis during the time period 1 January 1960 through 31 December 1962.
9. (U) The fact that Czechoslovakia was a SIGINT target during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
10. (U) Information derived from, or pertaining to, Czech air and air defense communications during and related to the crisis, and ELINT related to those communications. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
(U) The following guidance (items 11-16) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis for all time periods.
11. (U) The fact of NSA/CSS targeting/collecting diplomatic and International Commercial (ILC) communications during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A (U//FOUO) Details regarding this targeting/collection shall remain classified, to include identification of the specific diplomatic entity communicating or identification of the entity communicating using ILC communications.

(U//FOUO) Information from product reports derived from diplomatic and ILC communications shall not be released without approval from the Office of Policy and

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Records.
12. (S//REL) The fact of targeting Soviet General Staff communications. SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
1.4 (c) 25 years*
13. (U) Information contained in Category III SIGINT reports related to the Cuban Missile Crisis. TOP SECRET//
COMINT

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis.
1.4 (c) 25 years*
14. (U) Information reflecting U.S. relationships with Second or Third party partners. SECRET//COMINT

At a minimum.

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis.
1.4 (c) 25 years*
15. (U) Identification of SIGINT collection systems and techniques. CONFIDENTIAL

At minimum.

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis.
1.4 (c) 25 years*
16. (U) Information contained in high-level summaries that contain substantial amounts of cryptologic material or high-level all-source conclusions relating to Soviet involvement. CONFIDENTIAL

At a minimum.

Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis.
1.4 (c) 25 years*
(U) ELINT
17. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
18. (U) The fact of NSA/SCE ELINT targeting any countries or entities during and related to the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide. SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
1.4 (c) 25 years*
19. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified:
- by ELNOT (ELINT notation), or
- by nickname, or
- by identification of the associated system.
UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A (U) The association of an ELNOT with its related system nickname or other system identifier is classified.
20. (U) The fact of ELINT collection during and related to the crisis of signals from a specific type of radar, identified:
- by ELNOT and by nickname, or
CONFIDENTIAL//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN. GBR, NZL
1.4 (c) 25 years*

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- by ELNOT and by identification of the associated system.
21. (U) The fact of land-based ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
22. (U) The fact of airborne ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
23. (U) The identification of types of aircraft used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. Classification determined on a case-by-case basis. (U) Details relating to specific airborne platforms and systems used during the crisis should be treated according to applicable guidance.
24. (U) The identification of a specific aircraft used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. CONFIDENTIAL//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
1.4 (c) 25 years* (U) Regardless of how identified.
25. (U) The fact of shipborne ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
26. (U) The identification of types of ships used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
27. (U) The identification of a specific ship used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
28. (U) The fact of satellite/overhead ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A
29. (U) Details regarding satellite/overhead ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. CONFIDENTIAL//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

At a minimum.
1.4 (c) 25 years* (U) The association of a specific ELINT intercept with satellite/overhead collection is classified.
30. (U) The association of a specific ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis with a specific type of collection. SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
1.4 (c) 25 years*
31. (U) The association of a Circular Error of Probability (CEP) or a confidence ellipse with an ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis. SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

At a minimum.
1.4 (c) 25 years*
32. (U) Parametric data derived from ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis. SECRET//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

At a minimum.
1.4 (c) 25 years*

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(U) * 25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later.

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