NSA's collection processing and dissemination of allied communications

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2007-05-16
Pages: 4
Genre: newsletter
Classification: SECRET SI
Dissemination: NOFORN

A secret 2007 deal between the US and UK allowed the NSA to collect, store, and analyze personal data of British citizens — including those not suspected of wrongdoing — marking a significant expansion of mass surveillance powers and breaking prior Five-Eyes agreements on mutual non-targeting.

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No extended description available.
Programs:
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People mentioned:
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Tags:
data collection, data processing, identifiers, FVEY, targeting, UKUSA, email addresses, IP addresses, fax, phone numbers

Identifier:
EFF_-_20131120-guard-collection_processing_and_dissemination_of_allied_communications

PDF SHA-256:
a36cd9a4fdcea7abd4c2461997c9df8fddc98fda537074588f53b0f1dd03c22b

a) (S//SI//NF) Under the British-U.S. Communications Intelli-
gence Agreement of 5 March 1946 (commonly known as the United
Kingdom/United States of America (UKUSA) Agreement), both gov-
ernments agreed to exchange communications intelligence prod-
ucts, methods and techniques as applicable so long as it was not
prejudicial to national interests. This agreement has evolved to
include a common understanding that both governments will not
target each other's citizens/persons. However, when it is in the
best interest of each nation, each reserved the right to conduct
unilateral COMINT action against each other's citizens/persons.
Therefore, under certain circumstances, it may be advisable and
allowable to target Second Party persons and second party commu-
nications systems unilaterally when it is in the best interests of the
U.S. and necessary for U.S. national security. Such targeting must
be performed exclusively within the direction, procedures and deci-
sion processes outlined in this directive.

b) (S//SI//REL to UK, CAN, AUS, NZ and USA) There are
circumstances when targeting of Second party persons and com-
munications systems, with the full knowledge and cooperation of
one or more Second Parties, is allowed when it is in the best inter-
ests of both nations. This targeting will conform to guidelines set
forth in this directive.

b) (S//NF) Unilaterally by the Signals Intelligence Directorate:
When sharing the planned targeting information with a Second
Party would be contrary to U.S. interests, or when the Second Party
declines a collaboration proposal, the proposed targeting must be
presented to the Signals Intelligence Director for approval with
justification for the criticality of the proposed collection. If approved,
any collection, processing and dissemination of the Second Party
information must be maintained in NOFORN channels.

(S//SI//REL) SID Analysts Can Now Unminimize Incidentally Collected UK Contact Identifiers

FROM: [REDACTED]
SIGINT Policy (S02L1)
Run Date: 05/16/2007
(S//SI//REL) SIGINT Policy (S02L1) and the UK Liaison Office here at NSAW worked together to come up with a new policy that expands the use of
incidentally collected unminimized UK data in SIGINT analysis. The new policy expands the previous memo issued in 2004 that only allowed the
unminimizing of incidentally collected UK phone numbers for use in analysis. Now SID analysts can unminimize all incidentally collected UK contact
identifiers, including IP and email addresses, fax and cell phone numbers, for use in analysis. Analysts:

  • (S//SI//REL) Are authorized to unmask UK contact identifiers resulting from incidental collection. Incidental collection is defined as foreign com
    munications collected/selected incidental to the original SIGINT task.
  • (S//SI//REL) May utilize the UK contact identifiers in SIGINT development contact chaining analysis. The UK contact identifiers will not be the
    primary subject of SIGINT collection or analysis other than contact chaining except under existing authorization procedures.
  • (S//SI//REL) Will not deliberately collect against nor target UK contact identifiers for content unless so authorized.
  • (S//SI//REL) Will continue to minimize UK contact identifiers in any SIGINT product/service to include the dissemination of SIGINT metadata
    provided for foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with existing policy and procedures.
  • (S//SI//REL) May retain unminimized UK contact identifiers incidentally collected under this authority within content and metadata stores and
    provided to follow-on USSS (US SIGINT System) applications.
  • (S//SI//REL) Are not required to forward unmasked UK contact identifiers to GCHQ unless specifically requested by GCHQ. GCHQ should
    receive all unmasked UK contact identifiers via established or mutually agreed forwarding means or the contact identifiers should be available in
    the GCHQ-accessible 5-eyes [REDACTED] database, the [REDACTED] access to [REDACTED], or other GCHQ- accessible metadata stores.