Primary Order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

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Creating agency: FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (US)
Document date: 2009-09-03
Type: FOIA
Pages: 19
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: NOFORN
ACLU,EFF ↗2013-09-10

Statement by intelligence officials before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on FAA reauthorization. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.

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ACLU_-_pub_Sep_3_2009_Primary_Order_from_FISC

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UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM
[REDACTED]
(TS)

Docket Number: BR:
09-13

PRIMARY ORDER
A verified application having been made by the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act),
Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1861, as amended,
requiring the production to the National Security Agency (NSA)
of the tangible things described below, and full consideration

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Derived from: Pleadings in the above-captioned docket
Declassify on: 1 September 2034

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having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court
finds as follows:

  1. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the
    tangible things sought are relevant to authorized investigations
    (other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
    guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
    Order 12333 to protect against international terrorism, which
    investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
    activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
    of the United States. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
  2. The tangible things sought could be obtained with a
    subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in
    aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued
    by a court of the United States directing the production of
    records or tangible things. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D)]
  3. The application includes an enumeration of the
    minimization procedures the government proposes to follow with
    regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
    similar to the minimization procedures approved and adopted as
    binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number BR 09-09 and
    its predecessors. [50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1)]
    Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the
    United States to obtain the tangible things, as described below,
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satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred
on this Court by the Act, that the application is GRANTED, and
it is
FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
(1)Α. [REDACTED] shall
produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate secondary order,
and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for
the duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the
Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all
call detail records or "telephony metadata"¹ created by
[REDACTED]
In addition, the Custodian of Records of [REDACTED] shall
produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate Secondary Order
an electronic copy of the same tangible things created by [REDACTED]
for the period from 5:11 p.m. on July 9, 2009, to the date of
this Order, to the extent those records still exist.
1 For purposes of this Order "telephony metadata" includes
comprehensive communications routing information (e.g.,
originating and terminating telephone number, International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile
station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and
duration of call. Telephony metadata does not include the
substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information
of a subscriber or customer.
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B. The Custodian of Records of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
shall produce to NSA upon service of the appropriate
secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily
basis thereafter for the duration of this order, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the
following tangible things: all call detail records or
"telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] for communications (i)
between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
United States, including local telephone calls.
[REDACTED]
(2) With respect to any information the FBI receives as a
result of this Order (information that is passed or "tipped" to
it by NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization procedures the
procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations (September 29, 2008).
(3) With respect to the information that NSA receives as a
result of this Order, NSA shall strictly adhere to the following
minimization procedures:
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A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing
business record metadata acquired pursuant to this Court's
orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors ("BR
metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
Notwithstanding the requirements set forth below, Executive
Branch personnel may be permitted access to the BR metadata and
information derived therefrom in order to facilitate their
lawful oversight functions, which include, but are not limited
to, those set forth below.
B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of
ensuring data integrity and developing and testing any
technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes
shall be limited to the NSA Collection Managers, Data Integrity
Analysts, and System Administrators described in paragraph 16 of
the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA Oversight
and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
Directorate, the National Security Agency, filed as Exhibit A to
the Application in the above-captioned docket [REDACTED]
Declaration"). Additional individuals directly involved in
developing and testing technologies to be used with the BR
metadata may be granted access to the BR metadata, provided such
access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a
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case-by-case basis. Except as provided in paragraph (3)J,
persons who query the BR metadata pursuant to this paragraph may
only share the results of any such query with other specially-
cleared NSA technical personnel. Queries performed by the
persons described in this paragraph shall not be subject to the
approval process and standard set forth in paragraph (3) C below.
To the extent NSA personnel make copies of the BR metadata for
purposes of ensuring data integrity or developing and testing
technological measures, such copies shall be destroyed upon the
completion of their work.
C. Subject to the restrictions and procedures below,
the BR metadata may be accessed for purposes of obtaining
foreign intelligence information through contact chaining
[REDACTED] ("queries") using telephone
identifiers, ² as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at
paragraphs 8-13.
(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) below,
all telephone identifiers to be used for queries shall be
approved by one of the following designated approving
[REDACTED]
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officials: the Chief, Special FISA Oversight and
Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
Directorate; the Chief or Deputy Chief, Homeland Security
Analysis Center; or one of the twenty specially-authorized
Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and
Production Directorate of the Signals Intelligence
Directorate. Such approval shall be given only after the
designated approving official has determined that based on
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the telephone identifier to be queried is associated
with [REDACTED]
³ For purposes of this Order, the term [REDACTED] includes the following
[REDACTED]
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provided, however, that NSA'S OGC shall first determine
that any telephone identifier reasonably believed to be
used by a United States (U.S.) person is not regarded as
associated with [REDACTED]
solely on the basis of activities
that are protected by the First Amendment to the
[REDACTED]
⁴ For purposes of this Order, the term [REDACTED] refers to those
(namely [REDACTED] organizations involved in international terrorism
[REDACTED]
If
intelligence reveals the existence of other terrorist
organizations associated with the [REDACTED] the
Government shall seek the Court's approval before regarding them
as falling within [REDACTED]
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Constitution.⁵
(ii) Telephone identifiers that are currently
the subject of electronic surveillance authorized by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
based on the FISC's finding of probable cause to
believe that they are used by agents of [REDACTED]
including those used by U.S. persons, may be deemed
approved for querying for the period of FISC-
authorized electronic surveillance without review and
approval by a designated approving official. The
preceding sentence shall not apply to telephone
identifiers under surveillance pursuant to any
⁵ The Court understands that from time to time the information
available to designated approving officials will indicate that a
telephone identifier was, but may not presently be, or is, but
was not formerly, associated with [REDACTED]
In such a circumstance, so long as the
designated approving official can determine that the reasonable,
articulable suspicion standard can be met for a particular
period of time with respect the telephone identifier, NSA may
query the BR metadata using that telephone identifier. However,
analysts conducting queries using such telephone identifiers
must be made aware of the time period for which the telephone
identifier has been associated with [REDACTED]
in order that the analysis and
minimization of the information retrieved from their queries may
be informed by that fact.
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certification of the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General pursuant to Section 702 of
FISA, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, or
pursuant to an Order of the FISC issued under Section
703 or Section 704 of FISA, as added by the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008.
(iii) A determination by a designated approving
official that a telephone identifier is associated
with [REDACTED] shall be effective for: one hundred
eighty days for U.S. telephone identifiers and for any
identifiers believed to be used by a U.S. person; one
year for all other telephone identifiers.⁶
⁶ [REDACTED]
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D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain
mandatory procedures to strictly control access to and use of
the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders. NSA's
OGC shall continue to promptly provide NSD with copies of these
mandatory procedures (and all replacements, supplements or
revisions thereto in effect now or adopted in the future). The
Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight and
Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate; Chief and Deputy
Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the Homeland
Mission Coordinators shall maintain appropriate management
controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and
review procedures) for access to the metadata.
E. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED]
via [REDACTED] and shall store and
process the BR metadata on a secure internal network that NSA
exclusively will operate.
F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata
acquired pursuant to this order shall be conducted through the
NSA's secure internal network, which shall be accessible only to
authorized personnel, using accounts authorized by a user
authentication service, based on user login and password.
G. Access to the metadata shall be controlled by user name
and password. NSA's Oversight and Compliance Office shall
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monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR
metadata. When the BR metadata is accessed through queries
under paragraphs (3) B or (3) C above, a software interface shall
limit access to the BR metadata to authorized personnel, and the
user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and
retrieval request shall be automatically logged for auditing
capability.⁷ When the BR metadata is accessed through any other
means under paragraph (3) B above, the user's login, date and
time shall be automatically logged for auditing capability.
NSA's Office of Oversight and Compliance shall monitor the
functioning of this automatic logging capability. All persons
authorized for access to the BR metadata and other NSA personnel
who are authorized to receive query results shall receive
appropriate and adequate briefings by NSA'S OGC concerning the
authorization granted by this Order, the limited circumstances
in which the BR metadata may be accessed, and/or other
procedures and restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage,
and dissemination of the metadata.
⁷ In addition, the Court understands from the Declaration of
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director of NSA (Ex. A to
the Report of the United States filed in docket number BR 09-09
on August 17, 2009) that NSA has made a number of technical
modifications that will prohibit analysts: a) from inadvertently
accessing the BR metadata in [REDACTED] b) from querying the BR
metadata in [REDACTED] with non-RAS-approved identifiers; and c)
from going beyond three "hops" from an identifier used to query
the BR metadata in [REDACTED]
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H. NSA shall treat information from queries of the BR
metadata in accordance with USSID 18 and shall apply USSID 18 to
minimize information concerning U.S. persons obtained from the
records produced pursuant to the authorities granted herein.
Additionally, before the NSA disseminates any U.S. person
identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing
Services in the Signals Intelligence Directorate, the Senior
Operations Officer at NSA's National Security Operations Center,
the Signals Intelligence Directorate Director, the Deputy
Director of the NSA, or the Director of the NSA must determine
that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact
related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary
to understand the counterterrorism information or assess its
importance. Notwithstanding the above requirements, NSA may share
information derived from the BR metadata, including U.S. person
identifying information, with Executive Branch personnel in
order to enable them to determine whether the information
contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise
discoverable in legal proceedings. By 5:00p.m. each Friday
following the authorization requested herein, the government
shall file a report listing each instance during the seven-day
period ending the previous Friday in which NSA has shared, in
any form, information obtained or derived from the BR metadata
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with anyone outside NSA. For each such instance, the government
shall specify the date on which the information was shared, the
recipient of the information, and the form in which the
information was communicated (e.g., written report, e-mail, oral
communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S.
person information has been shared, except those involving
Executive Branch personnel seeking to identify discoverable
information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the
Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that one of the
authorized officials identified above determined, prior to
dissemination, that the information was related to
counterterrorism information and necessary to understand the
counterterrorism information or to assess its importance. This
paragraph's reporting requirement is not intended to apply to
instances in which BR metadata and information derived therefrom
is shared with Executive Branch personnel in order to facilitate
their lawful oversight functions.
I. Personnel authorized to query the BR metadata in
paragraph (3) C above may use and share the results of authorized
queries of the BR metadata among themselves and with NSA
personnel, including those who are not authorized to access the
BR metadata pursuant to paragraph (3)C, provided that all NSA
personnel receiving such query results in any form (except for
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information properly disseminated outside NSA) shall first
receive appropriate and adequate training and guidance regarding
the rules and restrictions governing the use, storage, and
dissemination of such information. NSA's Oversight and
Compliance Office shall monitor the designation of individuals
who have received the training and guidance necessary to receive
the results of queries of the BR metadata.
J. Authorized personnel also may use and share the identity
of high-volume telephone identifiers and other types of
identifiers not associated with specific users
[REDACTED] that they discover or have
discovered as a result of access authorized under paragraphs
(3)B and (3) C or as a result of technical personnel access under
prior docket numbers in this matter, among themselves and with
other NSA personnel, including those who are not authorized to
access the BR metadata, for purposes of metadata reduction and
management. The training requirements set forth in paragraph
(3) I above for NSA personnel receiving query results shall not
apply to personnel receiving such identifiers, which may have
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been identified through queries, so long as they are received
solely for purposes of metadata reduction and management.
K. The BR metadata collected under this Court's Orders may
be kept online (that is, accessible for queries) for five years
from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
destroyed.
L. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
granted herein, NSA's OGC shall conduct a random spot check,
consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records
obtained, to ensure that NSA is receiving only data as
authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive
content of communications.
M. At least twice before the expiration of the authorities
granted herein, the Department of Justice's National Security
Division (NSD) will review NSA's access to the BR metadata under
paragraph (3) C above. Such reviews shall include a sample of
the justifications designated approving officials relied upon to
approve telephone identifiers for querying the BR metadata, and
a review of the queries conducted.
N. NSA'S OGC shall consult with NSD on all significant
legal opinions that relate to the interpretation, scope, and/or
implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in
this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation
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shall occur in advance; otherwise, NSD shall be notified as soon
as practicable.
O. NSA'S OGC shall promptly provide NSD with copies of all
formal briefing and/or training materials (including all
revisions thereto) currently in use or prepared and used in the
future to brief/train NSA personnel concerning the
authorizations granted by this Order.
P. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
granted herein, a meeting for the purpose of assessing
compliance with this Court's orders in this matter shall be held
with representatives from NSA'S OGC, NSD, and appropriate
individuals from NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate. The
results of this meeting shall be reduced to writing and
submitted to the Court as part of any application to renew or
reinstate the authorities granted herein.
Q. At least once before the expiration of the authorities
granted herein, NSD shall meet with NSA's Office of Inspector
General (OIG) to discuss their respective oversight
responsibilities and assess NSA's compliance with the Court's
orders in this matter.
R. Prior to implementation, all proposed automated query
processes shall be reviewed and approved by NSA'S OGC, NSD, and
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the Court.⁸
S. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority
granted herein shall include a report describing: (i) the
queries made since the end of the reporting period of the last
report filed with the Court; (ii) the manner in which NSA
applied the procedures set forth in paragraph (3) C above; and
(iii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail
records would be received from the carriers and any significant
changes to the systems NSA uses to receive, store, process, and
disseminate BR metadata. In particular, the report shall describe
how NSA has conducted queries described in footnote 5 of this
order and minimized any information obtained or derived
therefrom.
//
//
//
⁸ The Court understands that NSA may begin testing of certain
automated processes (or capabilities associated with such
processes) within the next sixty days.
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This authorization regarding [REDACTED]
and unknown persons in the United States
and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
and unknown persons in the United States
and abroad affiliated with [REDACTED]
expires on 30th day of October 2009,
at 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.

Signed 09-03-2009 P03:33 Eastern Time
Date Time

REGGIE B. WALTON
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

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