Tag: telecommunications 86 documents
Search documents matching “telecommunications” →Free-text subjects the curators added. Unlike the other axes these are not necessarily from the documents' own vocabulary, so they are the loosest thing to browse by (and the most forgiving).
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RAMPART-A Project Overview [pdf]
This document is a 2010 project overview of RAMPART-A, a highly unconventional NSA special access program dedicated to tapping high-capacity international fiber-optic cables at global "congestion points." Through clandestine bilateral partnerships, the NSA installs U.S. equipment on foreign soil to intercept massive volumes of transit data, providing the agency with a unique vantage point that covers virtually every country in the world.
Programs: RAMPART-A · RAMPART-T · SMOKYSINK · AZUREPHOENIX · SPINNERET · TRANQUIL · MOONLIGHTPATH · FIREBIRD · FALCONSTRIKE · DULCIMER · REDHARVEST · FLASHMARK · CONDORSPEAK · TURMOIL · SSO“How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-06-18) · “NSA ‘third party’ partners tap the Internet backbone in global surveillance program” - Dagbladet Information ↗ (2014-06-19) · Gallagher, Ryan · Geist, Anton · Gjerding, Sebastian · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Jensen, Kristian -
RAMPART-A Sites [pdf]
This document specifies the data throughput and operational constraints of five key RAMPART-A interception sites, including the implementation of the "DNI Throttle" to manage data volume. It also defines the "Support Hub" model for managing signals tasking and explains the role of the REDHARVEST compartment in restricting which analysts can view specific digital network categories.
Programs: RAMPART-A · AZUREPHOENIX · MOONLIGHTPATH · SPINNERET · SMOKYSINK · FIREBIRD · XKEYSCORE · PINWALE · REDHARVEST · CADENCE“How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-06-18) · “NSA ‘third party’ partners tap the Internet backbone in global surveillance program” - Dagbladet Information ↗ (2014-06-19) · Gallagher, Ryan · Geist, Anton · Gjerding, Sebastian · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura -
REDACTED is the DA Technical Director SIDtoday [pdf]
Announcement of a new data acquisition technical director and chief of the Technical Advocate Office. This person recruits and trains cryptomathematicians and cryptanalysts and also oversees developments in telecommunications technology for the purpose of anticipating how targets will use it.
Programs: ITISThe Intercept ↗ (2016-08-10) -
Regions [pdf]
A classified GCHQ document listing 63 undersea and terrestrial cables accessible to British intelligence, with landing locations across the UK coastline and capacity figures in gigabits per second, forming part of the Snowden archive documents published by Süddeutsche Zeitung revealing Cable & Wireless/Gerontic's cooperation with GCHQ.
“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
SID Training Announcements SIDtoday [pdf]
Upcoming training announcements.
The Intercept ↗ (2016-05-16) -
SIERRA LEONE - BELGIUM [pdf]
May 2009 GCHQ report documents the interception of two satellite carriers linking Sierra Leone and Belgium (via INTELSAT 9F3), surveyed using the TERRAIN collection suite, which identified numerous email selectors of interest carried over the link. Among the hits was the email address of “Oles” — Octave Klaba, founder and CEO of OVH, Europe’s largest internet hosting company — flagged as a target alongside diplomatic and political addresses, though his presence on the list reflects metadata collection rather than proof his message contents were intercepted.
Programs: TERRAINPeople: Klaba, Octave -
SIGDEV Successes and Challenges of High Power Cordless Phones (HPCP) SIDtoday [pdf]
The High Power Cordless Phone Analysis cell was founded in 2003 after use of these "poor man's cellular" phones proliferated in the early 2000s. Analysts with this cell provide training about HPCP communication to other NSA staff, analyze intercepted communications, and develop new tools for working with this technology.
People: Alexander, BonifaceThe Intercept ↗ (2017-04-24) -
SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 [pdf]
This five-page document, written in 2012, is essentially a National Security Agency mission statement with broad goals, including a desire to push for changes in the law to provide the agency with expanded surveillance powers. It was written before Edward J. Snowden’s leaks, so it provides a glimpse at the thinking of agency officials before Mr. Snowden upset their political calculus.
People: Lynn, William J.“A Strategy for Surveillance Powers” - The New York Times ↗ (2013-11-22) · Risen, James · Poitras, Laura -
Slides Describe Mission Involving Huawei [pdf]
This document details an NSA-led strategic initiative to target Huawei due to its dominance in global telecommunications infrastructure. The operation (codenamed "Shotgiant") aims to exploit Huawei hardware to maintain access to target communications while investigating the company’s potential role in facilitating People’s Republic of China (PRC) signals intelligence and supply chain subversion.
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Special Source Operations [pdf]
This document provides an overview of the NSA’s Special Source Operations (SSO), characterizing the division as the premier "Cryptologic Provider" for intelligence derived from global high-capacity telecommunications. It outlines a three-tiered access portfolio—Corporate, Foreign, and Unilateral—designed to manage the "incredible challenge" of intercepting target communications across undersea fiber-optic cables that carry millions of simultaneous sessions.
Programs: RAMPART-A · WINDSTOP · BLARNEY · FAIRVIEW · STORMBREW · OAKSTAR · PRISM · RAMPART-I · RAMPART-T · SSO · RAMPART-X · ClanSIG · MYSTIC · LOPERS · WEALTHYCLUSTER-2 · DEEPDIVE · TURMOIL · FASCIA · PINWALE · MARINA · TRAFFICTHIEF · TWISTEDPATH · BLACKPEARL · ACS“How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-06-18) · “NSA ‘third party’ partners tap the Internet backbone in global surveillance program” - Dagbladet Information ↗ (2014-06-19) · Gallagher, Ryan · Geist, Anton · Gjerding, Sebastian · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura -
SSO - MYSTIC [pdf]
This collection of SSO slides details the NSA's MYSTIC program, a massive signals intelligence (SIGINT) operation capable of recording and archiving 100% of a country's mobile phone calls. The slides reveal the program's reach across several nations, using colorful codenames for specific collection sites.
Programs: MYSTIC · SCALAWAG · ACIDWASH · OILYRAG · VENATOR · RANCIDRINSE · LOLLYGAG · EVENINGEASEL · DUSKPALLET · BASECOAT · PERMANENTPRESS · ETCHINGSPIN“NSA surveillance program reaches ‘into the past’ to retrieve, replay phone calls” - The Washington Post ↗ (2014-03-18) · “The NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-05-19) · Gellman, Barton · Soltani, Ashkan · Devereaux, Ryan · Greenwald, Glenn · Poitras, Laura -
SSO Collection Optimization [pdf]
The documents reveal that the NSA, in collaboration with GCHQ, accessed private internal networks of Google and Yahoo by intercepting data in transit between their data centers, without breaking into user accounts or servers. This involved analyzing proprietary formats and protocols, such as Google’s Gaia authentication system, using specialized tools to extract intelligence while operating primarily under foreign jurisdiction with fewer legal restrictions.
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SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview [pdf]
A classified NSA training presentation providing analysts with a detailed overview of SSO's corporate collection portfolio — covering FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY, MADCAPOCELOT, and OAKSTAR — including their legal authorities, collection capabilities, tasking procedures, and data repositories, with BLARNEY identified as contributing to over 60% of counterterrorism reporting and over 80% of all FAA reporting.
Programs: OCTAVE · UTT · CADENCE · BLARNEY · STORMBREW · FAIRVIEW · DARKTHUNDER · STEELFLAUTA · MONKEYROCKET · SHIFTINGSHADOW · ORANGECRUSH · YACHTSHOP · ORANGEBLOSSOM · SILVERZEPHYR · BLUEZEPHYR · COBALTFALCON · PINWALE · YANKEE · XKEYSCORE · MAINWAY · TOYGRIPPE · BLACKPEARL · TWISTEDPATH · NUCLEON · DISHFIRE · WHITESQUALL · MISTRALWIND · SERRATEDEDGE · PERFECTSTORM · MARINA · MADCAPOCELOT · FIST · MDCP · OAKSTAR · SSO · PRISM · TMM · COWBOY“NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Greenwald, Glenn -
SSO dictionary relevant entries [pdf]
This document provides a detailed list of relevant entries related to NSA's Special Source Operations (SSO), highlighting various NSA surveillance and data collection systems used to monitor global communications. It includes descriptions of programs such as BIGBIRD and DISHFIRE, which focus on cable and SMS interception, as well as tools like LOPERS and COURIERSKILL for processing telephony metadata and refining target selection. The entries emphasize the extensive and automated nature of the NSA's intelligence-gathering operations, particularly in relation to undersea cables and telecommunication networks, and underscore the secretive and expansive scope of SSO's global surveillance activities.
Programs: ARTIFICE · BIGBIRD · FAIRVIEW · SSO · POORWILL · PINECONE · BLACKBELT · CADENCE · BLACKNIGHT · SHIPMASTER · COURIERSKILL · THEORYMASTER · WEALTHYCLUSTER · CLIFFSIDE · DISHFIRE · MARINA · MAINWAY · NUCLEON · PINWALE · FASCIA · BANYAN · LAMPSHADE · ASSOCIATION · HOMEBASE · SEDB · FRIAR · KEYCARD · TURMOIL · TURBULENCE · UTT · IRISHBEAUTY · OCTAVE · KOZYKOVE · LITHIUM · BLARNEY · LOPERS · MAILORDER · LUMBERYARD · MERLIN · NODDY · SAGUARO · NUTHATCH · CONTRAOCTAVE · XKEYSCORE · PLANK · RODEOSTAR · SAGURA · SERENADE · STARGATE · SILVERCOLLAM · SEALION · SEAGULL · SLIVER · SORA-2 · TITANPOINTE · TUBE · VPCS · STONEGATE“NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-06-25) · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Gallagher, Ryan -
SSO GHOSTMACHINE Analytics [pdf]
This document describes the NSA’s cloud analytics platform GHOSTMACHINE, used by Special Source Operations (SSO) to process and analyze massive volumes of data (e.g., from FASCIA) using Hadoop-based infrastructure. It’s essentially the backbone system for querying, correlating, and enriching surveillance data at scale — not just a single analytic, but the analytic/cloud environment powering many programs.
Programs: GHOSTMACHINE · FASCIA · CERF · POPTOP · DRT · SIGDASYS · JUGGERNAUT · SEADIVER · AST128 · TUSKATTIRE · ASDF · BROKENRECORD · REDHAWK · SSO -
Summary of GCHQ Info Wrt OC TSS1 Excerpt [pdf]
GCHQ Summary of RTRG (or RT-TG). The RTRG program provides real-time intelligence support for global operations, particularly in the context of the Global War on Terrorism, using tailored systems that integrate multiple data sources to enhance target identification and analysis. The success of RT-RG in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom led to an expansion of the programme to support operations in Korea and Afghanistan, with new applications for keyword-based selection and alerting on voice intercept being trialled.
“Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border” - The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan” - NRK ↗ (2019-05-29) · Moltke, Henrik · Skille, Øyvind Bye · Døvik, Olav · Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard · Fjørtoft, Martin -
Supporting Internet Operations - Special Source Access [pdf]
In this document GCHQ outlines its plans for expanding internet operations, focusing on increasing access to 10G bearers and enhancing its intercept and egress capabilities by 2011. The agency highlighted that “25 percent of all internet traffic” transits the U.K. through approximately 1,600 different 10-gigabit cables, and it noted that it could “survey the majority of the 1,600” to “select the most valuable to switch into our processing systems.”
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Telecomm Customers Can Now Pick Their Own Phone Numbers -- What Does It Mean for SIGINT? SIDtoday [pdf]
Pick-Your-Own-Number is a new feature made possible by VoIP providers such as Vonage, and as of 2004 rapidly gaining in popularity. Now that this phenomenon is taking off, it means that phone numbers no longer reliably correspond to the country of the subscriber. "Theoretically," the author writes, "Usama bin Laden could be using a U.S.-based number while located in Afghanistan!" This has legal complications for NSA, because they need to be able to spy on international targets, but USSID-18 regulations forbid them from spying on domestic targets. The author suggests that NSA could partner with law enforcement agencies, such as FBI, to target domestic phone numbers using the domestic surveillance law known as the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.
People: bin Laden, OsamaThe Intercept ↗ (2017-04-24) -
The Growth of the Pacific Technical Center SIDtoday [pdf]
Established in 2003, the Pacific Technical Center, located at Yokota Air Base outside Tokyo, is rapidly growing. It offers support to signals intelligence missions across the Pacific and includes a detachment on Okinawa.
Programs: CAMELUSThe Intercept ↗ (2018-08-15) -
US, German SIGINTers Increase Cooperation on African Targets [pdf]
This document details the operational rationale behind the "Joint SIGINT Activity" (JSA) at the Mangfall Kaserne facility in Bavaria, Germany, revealing that the NSA deepened its reliance on the German BND to fill intelligence collection gaps in Africa caused by the US military's focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. It outlines how the NSA leverages the BND's "modern and capable" infrastructure to conduct GSM and satellite surveillance on shared targets in Sudan, Algeria, and Somalia.