Tag: telecommunications surveillance 18 documents
Search documents matching “telecommunications surveillance” →Free-text subjects the curators added. Unlike the other axes these are not necessarily from the documents' own vocabulary, so they are the loosest thing to browse by (and the most forgiving).
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3G: impact and update - SDF Nov 09 [pdf]
This 2009 top-secret presentation from Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) detailing 3G mobile network rollouts in Southeast Asia and identifying Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife, and senior officials as surveillance targets. It includes handset information, call data records, intercepted call attempts, and outlines plans for continued interception of Indonesian leadership communications.
People: Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang · Herawati, Kristiani · Boediono · Kalla, Yusuf · Djalal, Dino Patti · Mallarangeng, Andi · Rajasa, Hatta · Indrawati, Sri Mulyani · Sucipto, Widodo Adi · Djalil, Sofyan“Australia's spy agencies targeted Indonesian president's mobile phone” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-11-17) · “Australia spied on Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, leaked Edward Snowden documents reveal” - ABC News ↗ (2013-11-18) · MacAskill, Ewen · Taylor, Lenore · Brissenden, Michael -
Access Breakdown [pdf]
This GCHQ document provides a technical breakdown of surveillance access points showing 11 different interception sites (with codenames like DONNINGTON, LATUS, SCEPTRE) accessing various undersea cables including Flag, Apollo North/South, BT, Cable & Wireless (C&W), SMW-3, Solas, and Verizon, totaling 541 10-gigabit connections representing 5,410 gigabits of surveillance capacity across the network.
Programs: DONNINGTON · LATUS · SCEPTRE · PRESCOTT · GIBUS · KIRKISTOWN · MONDELLO · LINNELL · CATEGORY · KNAPWEED · ELAPSE · BROKER“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
Access: Vision 2013 [pdf]
This July 2010 GCHQ strategic document outlines the agency's vision for 2013 to create "the world's biggest SIGINT engine" with access to 800 10-gigabit connections (up from existing capacity), expanding overseas operations to 60% while reducing UK-based to 40%, and developing new capabilities including computer network exploitation (CNE), exfiltration, beaconry, geolocation, and collection of "Internet Pocket Litter" like cookies and browsing data. The strategy emphasizes "scale and pace," "balance," and "agility" while claiming to operate within legal frameworks of "necessity, proportionality and authorisation," and highlights partnerships with second and third parties to access "intractable and hard targets."
Marking: SECRET -
AND THEY SAID TO THE TITANS: « WATCH OUT OLYMPIANS IN THE HOUSE! » [pdf]
This Top Secret CSEC “Olympia” document details a Canadian intelligence program that analyzed and tracked the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy’s telecommunications, mapping IPs, servers, proxies, and mobile devices while automating data collection and network analysis to develop actionable intelligence. It outlines tools, workflows, and contacts used for surveillance, though the presentation does not explain the specific purpose of the operation.
Programs: OLYMPIA · QUOVA · PROMETHEUS · PEITHO · SLINGSHOT · LEVITATE · STRATOS · EVILOLIVE · GCHQ Geofusion · ATLAS · HYPERION · ATHENA · DANAUS · TIDALSURGE · BLACKPEARL · MARINA · STARSEARCH · PEPPERBOX · TRITON · PACKAGEDGOODS · ARK · TOYGRIPPE · FRIARTUCK · MASTERSHAKE · COEUS · STALKER · MAINWAY · FASCIA · SEDB · OCTSKYWARD · FASTBAT · TWINSERPENT · EONBLUE · DISHFIRE · GNDB“Read a CSEC document that was first acquired by Edward Snowden” - The Globe and Mail ↗ (2013-11-30) · “Ministério de Minas e Energia está na mira de espiões americanos e canadenses” - O Globo ↗ (2013-10-06) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Freeze, Colin · Bridi, Sônia · Greenwald, Glenn -
Belgacom connections [pdf]
A "Belgacom connections" map lays out the carrier’s sprawling roaming and backbone interconnects, precisely the arteries GCHQ wanted to get access into. Under Operation Socialist GCHQ successfully gained access to Belgacom’s infrastructure, including internal employee computers and encrypted and unencrypted streams of private communications handled by the company.
Programs: CARBONROD“Operation Socialist: The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Lees hier hoe de Britse geheime dienst GCHQ Belgacom aanviel” - NRC ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Britse geheime dienst bespioneerde jarenlang Belgacom-klanten” - De Standaard ↗ (2014-12-13) · Gallagher, Ryan · Modderkolk, Huib · Vanhecke, Nikolas · Eeckhaut, Mark -
Cable Master List [pdf]
This GCHQ document is a comprehensive master list of undersea fiber optic cables tracked for surveillance purposes, including both cables with UK landing points and international cables without UK connections, detailing technical specifications, ownership, capacity data, and code names for telecommunications partner companies that provided the intelligence agency with surveillance access.
Programs: PINNAGE · PFENNINGALPHA · NIGELLA · REMEDY · HIASCO · GERONTIC · SCEPTRE · PRESCOTT · KIRKISTOWN · LINNELL · CATEGORY · DACRON · KNAPWEED · ELAPSE · VITREOUS · LITTLE · STREETCAR · GIBBUS · VISAGE · LATUS · NUMDAH“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
Cables we do not currently have good access [pdf]
This GCHQ document, titled "Cables we do not currently have good access," lists numerous undersea fiber-optic cables along with their active data capacity ("Lit Capacity"), indicating the substantial portion of global telecommunications infrastructure where the agency lacks adequate surveillance access, in contrast to other internal reports detailing cables it successfully monitors.
“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
HIMR Data Mining Research Problem Book [pdf]
This document is a research roadmap created by GCHQ for the Heilbronn Institute for Mathematical Research (HIMR). Its purpose is to guide long-term mathematical and data-mining research that could improve signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. It outlines key research problems, datasets, and collaboration plans between intelligence agencies and academic researchers. The main goal is to develop new algorithms and mathematical tools to analyze extremely large communications datasets produced by modern surveillance systems.
Programs: CLOUD · DISTILLERY · DISCOVER · PRESTON · LECKWITH · TERRAIN · BROADOAK · NGE · FIVEALIVE · CHARTBREAKER · FIRSTCONTACT · GEOFUSION · RADONSHARPEN-B · PRIMETIME · HIDDENOTTER · BAKERSDOZEN · CLASP · SALTYOTTER · BIRCH · SOLIDINK · FLUIDINK · MAMBA · GRINNINGROACH · PIRATECAREBEAR · AUTOASSOC · CROUCHINGSQUIRREL · HRMAP · KACHINA · SQUEAL · QUESTA · METEORSHOWER · SUNSTORM · GOLDMINE · HAGERAWEL · WOODY · BUZZ · SILVERLIBRARY · SILVERLINING · VALHALLA · MOUNTMCKINLEY · SEPANG · BLACKHOLE · SALAMANCA · HAGELAWEL · LUCKYSTRIKE · SPIKYROCK · MYOFIBRIL · INJUNCTION · PSYCHICSALMON · RAGINGBULLFROG · ROBOTICFISH · TIMIDTOAD · AURA · CARBONCOPY · CASK · CHORDAL · CRAN · INSTINCT · MADFORGE · SWAMP · VOLSUNGA · WHITERAVEN · MVR · PPF · JTRIG · MAPREDUCE · MAILORDERPeople: Tukey, John -
Intro to the VPN Exploitation Process [pdf]
NSA introduction to the VPN exploitation process from September 2010, presented by the OTP VPN Exploitation Team, covering the full workflow from initial collection through to sustained decryption of IPSec, PPTP, SSL and SSH traffic, with named exploitation successes including airlines, diplomatic missions, banks and intelligence services across Iran, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Indonesia and Mexico.
Programs: BLEAKINQUIRY · TOYGRIPPE · XKEYSCORE · MAILORDER · CORALREEF · VULCANDEATHGRIP · SCISSORS · TURTLEPOWER · PINWALE · FOURSCORE · CADENCE · UTT · VULCANMINDMELD · CAPRIOS · AGILITY · NKB · FOLLOWTHEMONEY -
Menwith databases as of Aug 2008 [pdf]
This document outlines database access and SIGINT missions at Menwith Hill Station (MHS) as of August 2008, detailing the specific programs, language branches, and target development teams supported, including repositories like DISHFIRE, MAINWAY, and PINWALE. It also notes that U.S. personnel use the SIGINT Contact Center (SCC) process for access, with certain NOFORN restrictions, and lists additional analytic tools available to MHS analysts.
Marking: CONFIDENTIALPrograms: ASSOCIATION · DISHFIRE · HOMEBASE GEO · MAINWAY · NUCLEON · PINWALE · SPOTBEAM · XKEYSCORE · BANYAN · BROOMSTICK · CULTWEAVE II · MARINA · TRAFFICTHIEF · FASCIA · OCTSKYWARD · ROADBED · TUNNINGFORK · AGILITY · CADENCE · CONTRAOCTAVE · GAMUT · UTT · NKB · OCTAVE · PUZZLECUBE · TKB -
NSA June 2012 SSO Weekly Brief Excerpt [pdf]
This NSA Special Source Operations (SSO) briefing from June 2012 describes SPINNERET, a surveillance program that became the second-largest source of phone calling records and "tips" feeding into SHELLTRUMPET, a system that obscures the origin of collected metadata before forwarding it to NSA's Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) in Texas. The document indicates SHELLTRUMPET "obfuscates the source designators" and filters metadata to only include call events within NSA-Texas's area of responsibility.
“Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border” - The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan” - NRK ↗ (2019-05-29) · Moltke, Henrik · Skille, Øyvind Bye · Døvik, Olav · Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard · Fjørtoft, Martin -
NSA Telegraph: SIGDEV Efforts in Support of the United Nations Framework for Climate Change Conference, Bali, Indonesia [pdf]
This NSA document from Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap reveals that the agency conducted surveillance operations during the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali, monitoring communications of Indonesian security forces, locating satellite uplinks including video feeds from the conference facility, and compromising the mobile phone number of Bali's Chief of Police. The operation, conducted in coordination with Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), was framed as a "self-initiated network development effort" to prepare for potential "emergency" collection, but effectively demonstrates intelligence agencies spying on a major international environmental and diplomatic gathering attended by 10,000 participants from 190 countries.
Programs: RAINFALL -
NTAC Overview [pdf]
This document outlines the structure, mission, and operations of the U.K.’s National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC), a GCHQ-controlled unit responsible for enabling and managing lawful interception of communications and decryption of data across national networks. It details NTAC’s integration into GCHQ, its key role in programs like MILKWHITE, its extensive interception capacity, and the technical and resource challenges it faces in adapting to evolving telecommunications technologies.
Marking: SECRET -
NWP NSA [pdf]
A January 2011 internal NSA newsletter from Yakima Research Station (YRS) covering the station's early history as the West Coast ECHELON/FROSTING satellite interception facility established in 1966 to collect INTELSAT communications, and its more recent expansion into cloud-based cyber threat discovery using FORNSAT and Special Source Operations data.
Programs: EARLYBIRD · FROSTING · TRANSIENT · ECHELON · JACKKNIFE · SAFEGUARD · STEAMS · CYBERQUEST · GINPENNANT · RUMBUCKET · CROSSBONES · SSO -
PRC Information Warfare & Huawei [pdf]
This NSA intelligence briefing on Huawei analyzes Huawei’s global telecommunications presence and its potential links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese government intelligence activities. It highlights concerns that Huawei’s international market expansion — including its subcontracted 2008 upgrade of the TAT-14 transatlantic cable carrying U.S. and defense communications — could be exploited by China for signals intelligence (SIGINT) purposes.
People: Chávez, Hugo -
Where we are [pdf]
This GCHQ document is a table tracking the agency's access to undersea fiber-optic cables as of an unspecified date, listing 13 cables with their codenames, telecommunications company partners (primarily "GERONTIC"/Cable & Wireless and "REMEDY"), and the capacity of data access and egress points measured in 10 gigabit connections. The table shows GCHQ had access to 592 10-gigabit connections across these cables with 69 egress points, with an unlabelled column totalling 2,960, with GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless) providing access to 9 of the 13 cables including FEA (NIGELLA), APOLLO North and South, and TAT-14S.
Programs: NUMDAH · SCEPTRE · NIGELLA · LATUS · ARCANO · MONDELLO · GIBUS · KIRKISTOWN · LINNELL · ELAPSE · GRASP · CATEGORY · KNAPWEED · DACRON · GERONTIC · REMEDY · SOLAS · APOLLO · FEA · SMW3“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
Where we want to be [pdf]
This GCHQ document outlines the agency's aspirational expansion plans for undersea cable surveillance, showing desired access to 24 cables (compared to 13 in the "Where we are" document) with a dramatic increase in surveillance capacity to 1,693 10-gigabit connections and 390 egress points—nearly triple the existing infrastructure. The document includes eight cables with generic names (Cable X, Y, Z and A to E), five of them with blank relationship fields, suggesting GCHQ was actively pursuing partnerships with additional telecommunications companies beyond GERONTIC (Cable & Wireless), REMEDY, DACRON, and newly mentioned partners STELLABLUE, PINNAGE, and LITTLE to achieve comprehensive global communications interception.
Programs: NUMDAH · SCEPTRE · HIASCO · NIGELLA · LATUS · PRESCOTT · ARCANO · MONDELLO · KIRKISTOWN · LINNELL · ELAPSE · CATEGORY · KNAPWEED · STELLABLUE · GRASP · VISAGE · REMEDY · GERONTIC · DACRON · PINNAGE · LITTLE“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
Yemen backhaul comms collected (Jan 2011) [pdf]
This brief GCHQ document from January 2011 describes intelligence collection operations against Yemen's microwave telecommunications infrastructure, where overhead (OH) tasking confirmed tower activity and analyzed GSM and CDMA backhaul communications using the ICS2 tool, yielding voice intercepts, SMS messages, and at least one dial number recognition (DNR) hit that significantly contributed to counterterrorism work.