Tag: loopholes 3 documents
Search documents matching “loopholes” →Free-text subjects the curators added. Unlike the other axes these are not necessarily from the documents' own vocabulary, so they are the loosest thing to browse by (and the most forgiving).
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FAA Certification Renewals with Caveats [pdf]
This NSA document shows that after the FISA Court found NSA’s upstream internet collection unconstitutional and illegal, the agency’s response was less about reform and more about finding technical and procedural workarounds to keep surveillance running as usual. While the court ordered changes within 30 days, NSA officials planned to sequester and filter “higher-risk” data to appease the judge—not halt collection—revealing a mindset focused on preserving operations rather than addressing legal violations.
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FAA702 Glossary - Section 702 of the Fisa Amendments Act (FAA) [pdf]
This document outlines NSA rules under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which prohibit directly targeting U.S. persons or individuals inside the U.S., but quietly note a 2011 rule change allowing analysts to use U.S. person identifiers to query data already collected under 702—pending internal oversight. This effectively establishes a “backdoor search” capability enabling warrantless searches of Americans’ communications stored in NSA databases. Section 702 also gives the NSA authority to target without warrant the communications of foreign targets.
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Procedures Used By The National Security Agency For Targeting Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed To Be Located Outside The United States To Acquire Foreign Intelligence Court Information Pursuant To Section 702 Of The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Of 1978 [pdf]
The NSA’s 2009 Section 702 targeting procedures lay out how analysts decide who can be surveilled without a warrant, supposedly limiting spying to foreigners abroad. In reality, the rules give the agency wide latitude to presume people are foreign, rely on vague “totality of the circumstances” tests, and allow broad technical methods like IP filters and metadata checks. Oversight is mostly internal and after-the-fact, creating significant potential for U.S. communications to be swept up with little accountability.
People: Holder, Eric H. Jr.