Country: Turkey 62 documents
Search documents matching “Turkey” →Countries mentioned in each document. A country may be mentioned directly (e.g., France) or inferred from a related reference, such as a city (Paris -> France) or a domain name (.fr -> France).
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NSA's 'Oldest' Partnership -- A Debate SIDtoday [pdf]
Turkey may not be the NSA’s oldest third-party partner, the writer says. Earlier signals intelligence foreign relationships are described.
The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
NSA's Oldest Third Party SIGINT Partnership SIDtoday [pdf]
The United States’s signals intelligence relationship with Turkey started with a 1949 verbal agreement between the CIA and Turkey’s intelligence organization. As of 2005, 40 NSA staffers in Ankara provide technical assistance, training, and support to Turkey’s military and civilian intelligence agencies. Although the NSA’s overt operations in Turkey ceased in 1993, covert SIGINT collection by NSA/CIA Special Collection Service continues from sites in Istanbul and Ankara.
Programs: SEA SENTRY“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
'Odd Jobs' Before NSA (part 2) SIDtoday [pdf]
Some more wacky jobs agency employees held prior to joining the NSA include dancing waitress and mosquito bite test count subject.
Marking: UNCLASSIFIEDThe Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) · “What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies” - The Intercept ↗ (2016-05-16) · Maass, Peter -
PRC Information Warfare & Huawei [pdf]
This NSA intelligence briefing on Huawei analyzes Huawei’s global telecommunications presence and its potential links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese government intelligence activities. It highlights concerns that Huawei’s international market expansion — including its subcontracted 2008 upgrade of the TAT-14 transatlantic cable carrying U.S. and defense communications — could be exploited by China for signals intelligence (SIGINT) purposes.
People: Chávez, Hugo -
Quick Deployment Keeps CT Collection Flowing SIDtoday [pdf]
In September 2004, satellite terminals for internet cafes in Iraq switched to a new communications hub in the UAE, cutting off NSA monitoring of internet in the cafes. Within 40 days, Signals Intelligence Directorate teams outfitted a Special Collection Service site in Ankara, Turkey, to intercept signals from the new hub, immediately resulting in a “successful raid in Kirkuk.”
The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
Responsibility 3B: Implications of Technology & Geopolitical Trends [pdf]
This document outlines a classified NSA report on geopolitical trends from 2011 to 2016, highlighting key issues like global energy security, military modernization in China and Russia, cyber threats, and the rise of extremism. Notably, climate change is ranked 31st out of 34 priorities, reflecting its relatively low importance compared to issues.
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SCS sites [pdf]
A TOP SECRET map from an SCS SIGDEV briefing, dated 13 August 2010, showing the global presence of the Special Collection Service — the joint CIA/NSA embassy-based interception unit — at some 80 sites worldwide, published (briefly unredacted) by Der Spiegel alongside its Merkel/Berlin embassy reporting, naming the specific cities where covert intercept posts operated, including Berlin, Frankfurt, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and dozens more.
Programs: VPCS -
SCS SITES [pdf]
This 2004 NSA document maps the global footprint of the Special Collection Service (SCS), the joint NSA–CIA program that conducts covert signals-intelligence collection from U.S. embassies and consulates abroad under diplomatic cover, prized for intercepting "leadership communications" from within national capitals. Effective January 2002, it lists roughly 65 active, survey, and future SCS sites worldwide.
“Da qui ci spiano gli americani” - L'Espresso ↗ (2013-12-05) · Greenwald, Glenn · Maurizi, Stefania -
Sharing Computer Network Operations Cryptologic Information with Foreign Partners [pdf]
The document is a secret NSA/CSS policy outlining guidelines for sharing Computer Network Operations (CNO) cryptologic information with foreign partners, including rules for cooperation in CNE and CND within existing intelligence relationships. The “Purpose and Scope” section on the first page appears to be unpublished elsewhere, while the Tier A and Tier B country lists match those publicly revealed in sources like Glenn Greenwald’s No Place to Hide.
“El CNI facilitó el espionaje masivo de EEUU a España” - El Mundo ↗ (2013-10-30) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Greenwald, Glenn · Aranda, Germán -
SID and RAD to Develop Lexicons in Five Languages SIDtoday [pdf]
SID's Center for Applied Machine Translation is creating lexicons covering biological weapons terminology in Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and Farsi. These will be integrated into its machine translation software.
Programs: CYBERTRANSThe Intercept ↗ (2016-12-07) -
Silent Success: SIGINT Synergy Helps Shape US Foreign Policy SIDtoday [pdf]
August 2010 internal NSA newsletter recounts how the agency used signals intelligence to support U.S. diplomacy during negotiations over the June 2010 UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. NSA described intercepting the communications of fellow UNSC members — including France, Japan, Mexico, and Brazil — to inform the U.S. Mission to the UN (USUN) how each country would vote, with one U.S. official praising SIGINT for revealing other diplomats’ true positions and "red lines" and giving Washington an upper hand; the resolution passed 12–2 (Brazil and Turkey against) with Lebanon abstaining.
“Spies of the digital age” - Época ↗ (2013-07-27) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Souza, Leonardo · Gomide, Raphael · Greenwald, Glenn -
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SINIO Summer Seminar: 'NATO Summit' SIDtoday [pdf]
The seminar will discuss the threat environment of an upcoming NATO Summit in Turkey and the SIGINT support that will be provided.
Marking: CONFIDENTIALPeople: Maines, MarilynThe Intercept ↗ (2016-12-07) -
Special Source Operations - Corporate Partner Access [pdf]
A classified NSA Special Source Operations briefing detailing the four major corporate partner surveillance programs — BLARNEY, FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, and OAKSTAR — their legal authorities, collection access points, target lists, and funding profiles totaling nearly $480 million in FY2010, revealing the infrastructure through which the NSA taps U.S. telecommunications companies to intercept international fiber optic communications on American soil.
Programs: BLARNEY · FAIRVIEW · STORMBREW · OAKSTAR · LITHIUM · ARTIFICE · ROCKSALT · SERENADE · PINECONE · BRECKENRIDGE · TAHOE · SUNVALLEY · WHISTLER · KILLINGTON · COPPERMOUNTAIN · MAVERICK · CONUS · TURMOIL · UTT · STEELKNIGHT · SSO“Snowden document reveals key role of companies in NSA data collection” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-11-01) · “NSA files decoded: Edward Snowden's surveillance revelations explained” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-11-01) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · “NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “Titanpointe: The NSA’s Spy Hub in New York, Hidden in Plain Sight” - The Intercept ↗ (2016-11-16) · MacAskill, Ewen · Rushe, Dominic · Dance, Gabriel · Greenwald, Glenn · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Gallagher, Ryan -
Special Source Operations corporate overview [pdf]
A classified NSA training presentation providing an in-depth operational overview of the FAIRVIEW program — the agency's largest corporate partner surveillance program — detailing its collection capabilities, legal authorities, TAO shaping operations, targeting tools, and productivity statistics, while revealing that BLARNEY/PRISM was the single most productive SSO program in 2012 with 806 serialized product reports.
Programs: FAIRVIEW · BLARNEY · PRISM · RAMPART-A · RAMPART-I · RAMPART-X · RAMPART-T · RAMPART-M · DGO · WINDSTOP · MYSTIC · PINWALE · XKEYSCORE · TURMOIL · STORMBREW · OAKSTAR · OCTAVE · UTT · CADENCE · COWBOY · YANKEE · MAINWAY · TOYGRIPPE · BLACKPEARL · TWISTEDPATH · NUCLEON · DISHFIRE · SPYDER · CARBONFURY · NATIVEFLORA · UNICORNSANDWICH · CROSSEYEDBEAR · SCORCHERSIX · TROPICTHUNDER · DARKTHUNDER · STEELFLAUTA · RAGTIME · SWEETSMACK2 · SOURSMACK2 · EVILOLIVE · SCALEABLE · FLEXIBLE · MONKEYROCKET · SHIFTINGSHADOW · ORANGECRUSH · YACHTSHOP · ORANGEBLOSSOM · SILVERZEPHYR · BLUEZEPHYR · COBALTFALCON · RAGTIME-A · RAGTIME-C · SSO · SURREY“NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-06-25) · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Gallagher, Ryan -
Terrorism or Political Action? The Anti-Imperialist Camp Crosses the Line SIDtoday [pdf]
The NSA targets a “little-known, Europe-based group” known as the Anti-Imperialist Camp, whose “inflammatory anti-U.S. rhetoric” was allegedly paired with aid to militant groups like Hezbollah and FARC. Surveillance of this group “has paid numerous dividends” and resulted in demand by the U.S. government that the Italian government arrest three activists in 2004. Six years later, the activists were cleared of all charges.
The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
The International Security Issues Build-Out SIDtoday [pdf]
The International Security Issues mission, which is responsible for 13 nations, is expanding beyond Washington to participate in build-outs at NSA facilities in Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, and the European Security Command.
Programs: FOLLOWTHEMONEYPeople: Hambleton, Regina“No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · “Japan Made Secret Deals With the NSA That Expanded Global Surveillance” - The Intercept ↗ (2017-04-24) · “アメリカに監視される日本 ~スノーデン“未公開ファイル”の衝撃” - NHK ↗ (2017-04-24) · The Intercept ↗ (2018-08-15) · Greenwald, Glenn · Gallagher, Ryan · Ikegami, Akira -
The Partnership Dissemination Cell - Information Sharing With Third Party SIGINT Partners (repost) SIDtoday [pdf]
Description of the Partnership Dissemination Cell, the office responsible for sharing SIGINT with third-party partners, including Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and Jordan.
Programs: EGRAMThe Intercept ↗ (2016-08-10) -
THIEVING MAGPIE: Using on-board GSM/GPRS services to track targets [pdf]
A GCHQ capability-development presentation on THIEVING MAGPIE, which uses the on-board GSM/GPRS services airlines offer to track targets in flight: comms backhauled over Inmarsat BGAN and collected via SOUTHWINDS, registration events tied to a flight number or callsign in near real time, events for BlackBerry handsets with their PINs and associated e-mail addresses, and content tasked into datastores with unselected traffic to XKEYSCORE.
“US and Britain refine their ability to tap into airline passenger’s mobile phones while they are in the air” - Le Monde ↗ (2016-12-07) · “American and British Spy Agencies Targeted In-Flight Mobile Phone Use” - The Intercept ↗ (2016-12-07) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Follorou, Jacques · Greenwald, Glenn -
United States SIGINT System January 2007 Strategic Mission List [pdf]
This 2007 list of the National Security Agency’s major missions illustrates the sweep of the agency’s goals for signals intelligence (Sigint) or electronic eavesdropping, which include not only such obvious targets as terrorist groups and Iran’s nuclear program, but the diplomacy and economic policy of friendly countries.