Banner: UK Top Secret Strap1 COMINT 4 documents
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A potential technique to deanonymise users of the TOR network [pdf]
A TOP SECRET GCHQ research presentation describing a traffic correlation attack against Tor — using cumulative packet counts observed simultaneously at a controlled exit node and at SIGINT collection points near a target's guard node to deanonymise Tor users without breaking the encryption — with GTE and JTRIG having adapted owned exit nodes to collect the required data for live deployment.
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A potential technique to deanonymise users of the TOR network [pdf]
The GCHQ technical report documenting the entry-exit traffic correlation attack against Tor — providing the complete mathematical specification, test methodology, experimental results and software reference implementation, with distribution to NSA R1, NSA R4, NSA CES, CSE, DSD, SEQUOIA, ICTR, JTRIG, TEA, GTE and multiple OPC divisions.
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Op MULLENIZE and beyond - Staining machines 10/10/12 [pdf]
This 2012 report from the NSA's British counterpart, the GCHQ, describes a method of "staining" electronic traffic to distinguish otherwise anonymous users. It is used to unmask Tor users and devices on networks in which many computers share the same Internet address. The method relies on planting code in a web browser to change the "user agent," which is the way the browser identifies itself on the web. In a two month period, the report says, GCHQ managed to implant about 200 computers with uniquely identifying stains.
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Tor Hidden Services - How Hidden is 'Hidden'? [pdf]
A TOP SECRET GCHQ presentation analysing the security of Tor hidden services — covering the hidden service protocol architecture, possible exploitation vectors including the Coil Attack against introduction points, a beaconing pattern discovered in idle hidden services, and the HOMING TROLL bridge discovery capability — concluding that hidden services are "near impossible" to deanonymise but noting several research avenues including PRESTON integration.