NSA Bonanni 2009 Jewel Declaration

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2009-04-03
Type: FOIA
Pages: 57
Classification: TOP SECRET TSP SI
Dissemination: ORCON, NOFORN
ACLU,EFF ↗2013-12-20

Classified declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni disclosing information regarding the government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.

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People mentioned:
Hertz, Michael F., Letter, Douglas N., Hunt, Joseph H., Garvey, Vincent M., Coppolino, Anthony J., Bonanni, Deborah A., Walker, Vaughn R., Jewel, Carolyn

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ACLU_-_NSA_Bonanni_2009_Jewel_Declaration

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MICHAEL F. HERTZ
Acting Assistant Attorney General
DOUGLAS N. LETTER
Terrorism Litigation Counsel
JOSEPH H. HUNT
Director, Federal Programs Branch
VINCENT M. GARVEY
Deputy Branch Director
ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO
Special Litigation Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
Phone: (202) 514-4782
Fax: (202) 616-8460

Attorneys for the United States and
Government Defendants Sued in their
Official Capacities

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROLYN JEWEL, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY et al.

Defendants.

No. 08-cv-4873-VRW

CLASSIFIED DECLARATION
OF DEBORAH A. BONANNI,
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
SUBMISSION

Date: June 25, 2009
Time: 2:30 p.m.
Courtroom 6, 17th Floor

Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No 08-cv-4873-VRW)

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Derived From NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20090403
Declassify On: 20340403

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(U) Table of Contents

I. (U) Introduction
II. (U) Summary
III. (U) Classification of Declaration
IV. (U) Background Information
A. (U) The National Security Agency
B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat
C. (U) Summary of NSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda Threat

V. (U) NSA Information Protected by Privilege Assertions
VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure
A. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether or Not the Plaintiffs Have Been Subject to the Alleged NSA Activities
B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, and Methods Implicated by Plaintiffs' Allegations

  1. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications Dragnet
    (a) (U) Information Related to Terrorist Surveillance Program
    (b) (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of Communication Records
  2. (TS//SI//OC//NF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized Activities and Specific FISC Orders.
  3. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that AT&T Provided Assistance to the NSA with the Alleged Activities
    VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed
    VIII. (U) Summary and Conclusion

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF DEBORAH A. BONANNI
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

(U) I, Deborah A. Bonanni, do hereby state and declare as follows:

I. (U) Introduction

  1. (U) I am the Chief of Staff for the National Security Agency (NSA), an
    intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. I have held this position since February
  2. As the Chief of Staff, under our internal regulations, and in the absence of the Deputy
    Director and the Director, I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing the operations
    undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the Director of
    National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and methods. I have
    been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority under Executive Order No.
    12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995), as amended on March 25, 2003, and Department of Defense
    Directive No. 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159a.12 (2000).
  1. (U) The purpose of this declaration is to support an assertion of the military and
    state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") by the Director of National Intelligence
    ("DNI") as the head of the intelligence community, as well as by the DNI's assertion of a statutory
    privilege under the National Security Act, to protect information related to NSA activities
    described herein below. Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the Director of the National
    Security Agency, has been sued in his official and individual capacity in the above captioned case
    and has recused himself from the decision of whether to assert the statutory privilege in his
    official capacity. As the Deputy Director is currently out of the office on temporary duty, by
    operation of our internal regulations and by specific delegation of the Director, I am authorized to
    review the materials associated with this litigation, prepare whatever declarations I determine are
    appropriate, and determine whether to assert the NSA's statutory privilege. Through this

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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declaration, I hereby invoke and assert the NSA's statutory privilege set forth in Section 6 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 U.S.C.
§ 402) ("NSA Act"), to protect the information related to NSA activities described herein below.
The statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge of NSA activities and
operations, and on information made available to me as the Chief of Staff of the NSA.

II. (U) Summary

  1. (U) In the course of my official duties, I have been advised of this litigation and I
    have reviewed the allegations in the Complaint in this case. In sum, plaintiffs allege that, after
    the 9/11 attacks, the NSA received presidential authorization to engage in surveillance activities
    far broader than the publicly acknowledged "Terrorist Surveillance Program" ("TSP"), which
    involved the interception of specific international communications involving persons reasonably
    believed to be associated with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations. Plaintiffs allege
    that the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunication companies including AT&T, has
    indiscriminately intercepted the content and obtained the communications records of millions of
    ordinary Americans as part of an alleged presidentially-authorized "Program" after 9/11. See
    Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97. I cannot disclose on the public record the nature of any NSA
    information implicated by the plaintiffs' allegations. However, as described further below, the
    disclosure of information related to the NSA's activities, sources and methods implicated by the
    plaintiffs' allegations reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
    national security of the United States and, for this reason, are encompassed by the DNI's state
    secrets and statutory privilege assertions, as well as by my assertion of the NSA statutory
    [REDACTED] privilege, and should be protected from disclosure in this case. In addition, it is my judgment
    that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to
    proceed in the case risks the disclosure of the classified privileged national security information

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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described herein and exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
4. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The allegations in this lawsuit put at issue the disclosure
of information concerning several highly classified and critically important NSA intelligence
activities that commenced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but which are now conducted pursuant
to authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), including ongoing activities
conducted under orders approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC").
Plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA undertakes indiscriminate surveillance of the content of
millions of communications sent or received by people inside the United States—under the now
defunct-TSP or otherwise—is false, as discussed below. The NSA's collection of the content of
communications under the TSP was directed at international communications in which a
participant was reasonably believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated organization
and did not constitute the kind of dragnet collection of the content of millions of Americans'
telephone or Internet communications that the plaintiffs allege. Although the existence of the
TSP has been acknowledged, the details of that program remain highly classified, along with
details of related content surveillance activities undertaken after the TSP pursuant to orders of
the FISC. This information could not be disclosed to address or disprove or otherwise litigate
the plaintiffs' allegation of a content dragnet without causing exceptional harm to NSA's sources
and methods of gathering intelligence—including methods currently used to detect and prevent
further terrorist attacks under the authority of the FISA.
5. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition, as the Court should also be aware from prior
classified declarations submitted by the NSA in related proceedings, the NSA has collected,
pursuant to presidential authorization and currently under subsequent FISC orders, non-content

Footnote 1: (TS//SI//OC/NF) The term "content" is used herein to refer to the substance, meaning,
or purport of a communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as opposed to the type of
addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as "meta data."

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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information (i.e., meta data) about telephone and Internet communications in order to enable
[REDACTED] highly sophisticated analytical tools that can uncover the contacts [REDACTED] of
members or agents of [REDACTED]. As noted above and detailed
below, the content surveillance subject to presidential authorization after 9/11 was not the
content dragnet surveillance that plaintiffs allege, and the collection of non-content information,
while significant in scope remains a highly classified matter currently under FISA authorization.
For the NSA to attempt to explain, clarify, disprove, or otherwise litigate plaintiffs' allegations
regarding a communications dragnet would require the NSA to confirm the existence of, or
disclose facts concerning, intelligence sources and methods for the collection of non-content
information related to communications, as well as current NSA operations under FISC Orders—
disclosures that would cause exceptional harm to national security.

  1. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP//OC/NF) In addition, plaintiffs' allegation that
    telecommunications carriers, in particular AT&T, assisted the NSA in alleged intelligence
    activities cannot be confirmed or denied without risking exceptionally grave harm to national
    security. Because the NSA has not undertaken the alleged dragnet collection of communications
    content, no carrier has assisted in that alleged activity.
    [REDACTED]
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Footnote 2: (TS//SI//OC/NF) Certain FISC Orders are also directed at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Because the allegations in the complaint reference activities
authorized after 9/11, which were directed at [REDACTED] any
further references to the FISC Orders will focus solely on activities under the orders directed at
[REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Disclosure of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security.

  1. (T-S//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP/OCANF) Accordingly, the DNI's state secrets and
    statutory privilege assertions, and my own statutory privilege assertion, seek to protect against
    the disclosure of the highly classified intelligence sources and methods put at issue in this case
    and vital to the national security of the United States, including: (1) any information that would
    tend to confirm or deny whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs, have been
    subject to the alleged NSA intelligence activities; (2) information concerning NSA intelligence
    sources and methods, including facts demonstrating that the content collection under the TSP
    was limited to specific al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related international communications
    and was not a content surveillance dragnet as plaintiffs allege; (3) facts that would tend to
    confirm or deny the existence of the NSA's bulk meta data collection and use, and any
    information about those activities; and (4) the fact that [REDACTED].
    The fact that there has been public speculation
    about alleged NSA activities does not diminish the need to protect intelligence sources and
    methods from further exposure. Official confirmation and disclosure of the classified privileged
    national security information described herein would cause exceptionally grave damage to the
    national security. For these reasons, as set forth further below, I request that the Court uphold
    the state secrets and statutory privilege assertions that the DNI and I now make, and protect the
    information described in this declaration from disclosure.

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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III. (U) Classification of Declaration

  1. (S//SI//NF) This declaration is classified TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-ECI
    ORCON/NOFORN pursuant to the standards in Executive Order No. 12958, as amended
    by Executive Order No. 13292. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified
    "TOP SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
    cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if
    unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious
    damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the
    information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At
    the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letter or letters in parentheses
    designate(s) the degree of classification of the information the paragraph contains. When used
    for this purpose, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is
    either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET³.
  1. (S//SI//NF) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented
    Information (SCI), which is "information that not only is classified for national security reasons
    as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but also is subject to special access and handling
    requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and
    methods." 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a). Because of the exceptional sensitivity and vulnerability of such
    information, these safeguards and access requirements exceed the access standards that are
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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normally required for information of the same classification level. Specifically, this declaration
references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special intelligence (SI),
which is a subcategory of SCI. COMINT or SI identifies SCI that was derived from exploiting
cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from
intercepted foreign communications.

  1. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information
    related to or derived from the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals
    intelligence program under presidential authorization in response to the attacks of September 11,
  2. Although TSP was publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush in December 2005,
    details about the program remain highly classified and strictly compartmented. Information
    pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP" and requires more
    restrictive handling.
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
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  3. (S//SI//NF) In addition to the fact that classified information contained herein
    may not be revealed to any person without authorization pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as
    amended, this declaration contains information that may not be released to foreign governments,
    foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
that the originator of the information controls to whom it is released.

IV. (U) Background Information

A. (U) The National Security Agency

  1. (U) The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately
    organized agency within the Department of Defense. The NSA's foreign intelligence mission
    includes the responsibility to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals
    intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which communications intelligence ("COMINT") is a
    significant subset, for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes,
    and (c) the support of military operations. See Executive Order 12333, § 1.7(c), as amended.³
  1. (TS//SI//SI) signals intelligence (SIGINT) consists of three subcategories:
    (1) communications intelligence (COMINT); (2) electronic intelligence (ELINT); and (3) foreign
    instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Communications intelligence (COMINT) is
    defined as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the
    obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18
    U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign and
    international communications, such as voice, facsimile, and computer-to-computer information
    conveyed via a number of means [REDACTED].
    Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is technical intelligence information derived from
    foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive
    sources-in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship) and
    civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). Foreign instrumentation signals

Footnote 3: (U) Section 1.7(c) of E.O. 12333, as amended, specifically authorizes the NSA to
"Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate
signals intelligence information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to
support national and departmental missions."

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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intelligence (FISINT) is derived from non-U.S. aerospace surfaces and subsurface systems which
may have either military or civilian applications.

  1. (S//SI//NF) The NSA's SIGINT responsibilities include establishing and
    operating an effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in Executive
    Order No. 12333, § 1.12(b), as amended. In performing its SIGINT mission, NSA has
    developed a sophisticated worldwide SIGINT collection network that acquires, among other
    things, foreign and international electronic communications and related information. The
    technological infrastructure that supports the NSA's foreign intelligence information collection
    network has taken years to develop at a cost of billions of dollars and untold human effort. It
    relies on sophisticated collection and processing technology.
  1. (U) There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign
    intelligence information. The first, and most important, is to gain information required to direct
    U.S. resources necessary to counter external threats and in support of military operations. The
    second reason is to obtain information necessary to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
    Foreign intelligence information provided by the NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of
    important issues, including military order of battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms
    proliferation; international terrorism; counter-intelligence; and foreign aspects of international
    narcotics trafficking.
  1. (S//SI//NF) The NSA's ability to produce foreign intelligence information
    depends on its access to foreign and international electronic communications. Foreign
    intelligence produced by COMINT activities is an extremely important part of the overall foreign
    intelligence information available to the United States and is often unobtainable by other means.
    Public disclosure of either the capability to collect specific communications or the substance of
    the information derived from such collection itself can easily alert targets to the vulnerability of

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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their communications. Disclosure of even a single communication holds the potential of
revealing intelligence collection techniques that are applied against targets around the world.
Once alerted, targets can frustrate COMINT collection by using different or new encryption
techniques, by disseminating disinformation, or by utilizing a different communications link.
Such evasion techniques may inhibit access to the target's communications and therefore deny
the United States access to information crucial to the defense of the United States both at home
and abroad. COMINT is provided special statutory protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which
makes it a crime to knowingly disclose to an unauthorized person classified information
"concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign
government."

B. (U) September 11, 2001 and the al Qaeda Threat

  1. (U) On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
    coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each
    carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al
    Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two
    of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.
    Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third
    jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth
    jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville,
    Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or
    the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitation
    blow to the Government of the United States—to kill the President, the Vice President, or
    Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths—
    the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history. In addition,

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets
and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.

  1. (U) On September 14, 2001, a national emergency was declared "by reason of the
    terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the
    continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States." Presidential
    Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The United States also
    immediately began plans for a military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and
    havens in Afghanistan. On September 14, 2001, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint
    Resolution authorizing the President of the United States "to use all necessary and appropriate
    force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
    committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" of September 11. Authorization for Use of Military
    Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 21(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) ("Cong. Auth.").
    Congress also expressly acknowledged that the attacks rendered it "necessary and appropriate"
    for the United States to exercise its right "to protect United States citizens both at home and
    abroad," and acknowledged in particular that "the President has authority under the Constitution
    to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States." Id.
    pmbl.
  1. (U) Also after the 9/11 attacks, a Military Order was issued stating that the attacks
    of September 11 "created a state of armed conflict," see Military Order by the President § 1(a),
    66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), and that al Qaeda terrorists "possess both the
    capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if
    not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of
    property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
    Government," and concluding that "an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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purposes." Military Order, § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34. Indeed, shortly after the
attacks, on October 2, 2001, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an "armed attack against one or more of [the parties]
shall be considered an attack against them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.

  1. (U) As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
    States found itself immediately propelled into a worldwide war against a network of terrorist
    groups, centered on and affiliated with al Qaeda, that possesses the evolving capability and
    intention of inflicting further catastrophic attacks on the United States. That war is continuing
    today, at home as well as abroad. Moreover, the war against al Qaeda and its allies is a different
    kind of war, against a very different enemy, than any other war or enemy the Nation has
    previously faced. Al Qaeda and its supporters operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a
    diffuse, decentralized global network of individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate
    groups, that act sometimes in concert, sometimes independently, and sometimes in the United
    States, but always in secret—and their mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life
    through terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in the shadows; secrecy is essential to al Qaeda's success
    in plotting and executing its terrorist attacks.
  1. (TS//SI//NF) The Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Admiral Dennis
    C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, details the particular facets of the continuing al Qaeda
    threat and, thus, the exigent need for the NSA intelligence activities described here. The NSA
    activities are directed at that threat, [REDACTED].
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    Global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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developed in recent years into a loosely interconnected system—a network of networks—that is
ideally suited for the secret communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. Hundreds
of Internet service providers, or "ISPs," and other providers of communications services offer a
wide variety of global communications options, often free of charge.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

  1. (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED]
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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
23. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Our efforts against al Qaeda and its affiliates therefore present
critical challenges for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this new
kind of war, more than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is essential
to our ability to identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks on the
United States. Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the
identities of particular individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of
particular terrorist threats. Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more
important than ever, the decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the enemy and their
sophistication in exploiting the agility of modern telecommunications make successful
communications intelligence more difficult than ever. It is against this backdrop that the risks
presented by this litigation should be assessed, in particular the risks of disclosing particular
NSA sources and methods implicated by the claims.

C. (U) Summary of NSA Activities After 9/11 to Meet al Qaeda Threat.

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) After the September 11 attacks, the NSA received presidential
    authorization and direction to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks within the United States
    by intercepting the content of telephone and Internet communications for which there were
    reasonable grounds to believe that (1) such communications originated or terminated outside the
    United States and (2) a party to such communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
    affiliated terrorist organization. The existence of this activity was disclosed by then-President
    Bush in December 2005 (and subsequently referred to as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" or
    "TSP").⁷

Footnote 7: (U) On January 17, 2007, the Attorney General made public the general facts that new
orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been issued that authorized the
Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States
[REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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25. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In more specific and classified terms, the NSA has
utilized a number of critically important intelligence sources and methods to meet the threat of
another mass casualty terrorist attack on the United States—methods that were designed to work
in tandem and continue to this day under authority of the FISC. As noted above, one such
method involved the program publicly acknowledged by then-President Bush as the TSP, in
which the NSA intercepted the content of telephone and Internet communications pursuant to
presidential authorization.⁸ As described further below, under the TSP, NSA did not engage in
plaintiffs' alleged dragnet surveillance of communication content, but intercepted the content of
particular communications where reasonable grounds existed to believe one party involved a
member or agent of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organization based on particular "selectors"
(phone numbers or Internet addresses) associated with that target. In addition to collecting the
content of particular communications, the NSA has also collected non-content communication
information known as "meta data." Specifically, after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA collected bulk
meta data related to telephony communications for the purpose of conducting targeted analysis to
[REDACTED]
where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al
Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization; that, as a result of these orders, any electronic
surveillance that had been occurring as part of the TSP was then being conducted subject to the
approval of the FISA Court; and that, under these circumstances, the TSP was not reauthorized.

Footnote 8: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The first presidential authorization of the TSP was on October
4, 2001, and the TSP was reauthorized approximately every 30-60 days throughout the existence
of the program. The documents authorizing the TSP also contained the authorizations for the
meta data activities described herein. The authorizations, moreover, evolved over time, and
during certain periods authorized other activities (this declaration is not intended to and does not
fully describe the authorizations and the differences in those authorizations over time).
See In Camera, Ex Parte
Classified Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander at ¶ 62, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW (N.D.
Cal.) (relating to all actions against the MCI and Verizon Defendants) (submitted Apr. 20, 2007).
[REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
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[REDACTED] Telephony meta data is information derived from call detail
records that reflect non-content information such as, but not limited to, the date, time, and
duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers used to place and receive the calls.⁹ In
addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the NSA has collected bulk meta data related to Internet
communications. Internet meta data is header/router/addressing information, such as the "to,"
"from," "cc," and "bcc" lines, as opposed to the body or "re" lines, of a standard email.

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Each of the foregoing activities continues in some form under
    authority of the FISA and, thus, the NSA utilizes the same intelligence sources and methods
    today to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks that it did after the 9/11 attacks. First, as
    noted above, on January 10, 2007, the FISC issued two orders authorizing the Government to
    conduct certain electronic surveillance that had been occurring under the TSP. The FISC Orders
    were implemented on January 17, 2007 and, thereafter, any electronic surveillance that had been
    occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISC and the TSP was not
    reauthorized.¹⁰
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Footnote 9: (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//TSP//OC/NF)
Footnote 10: (TS//SI//OC/NF) As also described further (¶¶ 64-67 infra), the FISC has extended
these orders with some modifications, and the Foreign Telephone and Email Order later expired
in August 2007 and was supplanted by authority enacted by Congress first under the Protect
[REDACTED]

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27. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Second, with respect to the collection of telephony meta data,
since May 2006 certain telecommunication providers have been required by an order of the FISC
to produce to the NSA on a daily basis all telephony meta data that they create ("FISC Telephone
Business Records Order"). The FISC Telephone Business Records Order has been reauthorized
approximately every 90 days since it was first issued. Although this collection is broad in scope,
the NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived telephony data with identified
telephone numbers for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the number is associated with [REDACTED] (hereafter referred to
as a "RAS" determination).¹¹ Historically, only a tiny fraction of telephony meta data records
collected by the NSA has actually been presented to a trained professional for analysis. As
discussed further below (see ¶¶ 49-57 infra), while the vast majority of records are thus never
viewed by a human at the NSA, it is still necessary to collect the meta data in bulk in order to
[REDACTED] utilize sophisticated and vital analytical tools for tracking the contacts [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] for protecting the national security of the United States.
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America Act and then the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to authorize foreign intelligence
surveillance of targets located overseas without individual court orders.

Footnote 11: (TS//SI//OC/NF) As set forth further below (¶¶ 61-63 infra), NSA's compliance with
this limitation in the FISC Order has been subject to further proceedings in the FISC that
commenced with a compliance report by the government on January 15, 2009, which indicated
that the NSA had also been querying incoming telephony meta data with selectors for
counterterrorism targets subject to NSA surveillance under Executive Order 12333, as to which
the NSA had not made a "RAS" determination. On March 2, 2009, the FISC renewed the Order
authorizing the bulk provision to NSA of business records containing telephony meta data from
telecommunications carriers [REDACTED] but subjected that activity to new limitations,
including that the NSA may query the meta data only after a motion is granted on a case-by-case
basis (unless otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life). The FISC
also required the government to report to the FISC on its review of revisions to the meta data
collection and analysis process, and that report shall include affidavits describing the value of the
collection of telephony meta data authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order.

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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28. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Third, beginning in July 2004, the collection of Internet meta
data in bulk has been conducted pursuant to an order of the FISC authorizing the use of a pen
register and trap and trace device ("FISC Pen Register Order" or "PRTT Order"). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127 (defining "pen register" and "trap and trace device"). Pursuant to the FISC Pen Register
Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days since it was first issued, the
NSA is authorized to collect, in bulk, meta data associated with electronic communications
[REDACTED] on the Internet.¹²
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] Although the NSA collects email meta data in bulk,
[REDACTED] it has been authorized by the FISC to query the archived meta data only using email
addresses for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email
address is associated with [REDACTED] (similar restrictions were
in place under the presidential authorization). As with bulk telephony meta data collection, bulk
Internet meta data collection is necessary to allow the NSA to use critical and unique analytical
capabilities to track the contacts (even retrospectively) [REDACTED] of
terrorists. Like telephony meta data activities, Internet meta data collection and analysis are vital
[REDACTED]
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Footnote 12: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]

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tools for protecting the United States from attack, and, accordingly, information pertaining to
those activities is highly classified.¹³

V. (U) Information Protected by Privilege

  1. (U) In general and unclassified terms, the following categories of information are
    subject to the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege under the
    National Security Act, as well as my assertion of the NSA statutory privilege:
    A. Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether the
    plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA intelligence
    activity that may be at issue in this matter; and
    B. Any information concerning NSA intelligence activities,
    sources, or methods that may relate to or be necessary to
    adjudicate plaintiffs' allegations, including allegations that
    the NSA, with the assistance of telecommunications
    carriers such as AT&T, indiscriminately intercepts the
    content of communications and also collects the
    communication records of millions of Americans as part of
    an alleged presidentially authorized "Program" after 9/11.
    See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 2-13; 39-97.
    The scope of this assertion includes but is not limited to:
    (i) Information concerning the scope and operation
    of the now inoperative "Terrorist Surveillance Program"
    ("TSP") regarding the interception of the content of certain
    one-end international communications reasonably believed
    to involve a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated
    terrorist organization, and any other information related to
    demonstrating that the NSA does not otherwise engage in
    the content surveillance dragnet that the plaintiffs allege;
    and
    (ii) Information concerning whether or not the NSA
    obtained from telecommunications companies such as
    [REDACTED]

Footnote 13: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) As the NSA has previously advised the Court in related
proceedings, and describes further below (see note 23 infra), the bulk collection of Internet meta
data pursuant to presidential authorization ceased in [REDACTED] 2004. See *In Camera, Ex Parte
Classified Declaration of Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander* at ¶ 31 n.8, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW
(N.D. Cal.) (relating to all actions against the MCI and Verizon Defendants) (submitted Apr. 20,
2007).

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Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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AT&T communication transactional records as alleged in
the Complaint; see, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 10; 82-97; and
(iii) Information that may tend to confirm or deny
whether AT&T (and to the extent relevant or necessary,
any other telecommunications carrier), has provided
assistance to the NSA in connection with any alleged
activity.

VI. (U) Description of Information Subject to Privilege and the Harm of Disclosure

A. (U) Information That May Tend to Confirm or Deny Whether the Plaintiffs Have
Been Subject to Any Alleged NSA Activities.

  1. (U) The first major category of information as to which I am supporting the DNI'S
    assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's own statutory privilege, concerns information as
    to whether particular individuals, including the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, have been
    subject to alleged NSA intelligence activities. As set forth below, disclosure of such information
    would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security.
    (TS//SI-[REDACTED])
  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The five named plaintiffs in this case—Tash Hepting,
    Gregory Hicks, Carolyn Jewel, Erik Knutzen and Joice Walton have alleged that, pursuant to a
    presidentially authorized program after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA, with the assistance of AT&T,
    has acquired and continues to acquire the content of phone calls, emails, instant messages, text
    messages, web and other communications, both international and domestic, of millions of
    ordinary Americans—"practically every American who uses the phone system or the Internet"—
    including the plaintiffs, as well as private telephone and Internet transaction records of millions
    of AT&T customers, again including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and
    Internet communications. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10; see also ¶¶ 39-97. As set forth
    herein, the NSA does not engage in "dragnet" surveillance of the content of communications as
    plaintiffs allege, [REDACTED].

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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Footnote 14: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
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Footnote 15: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]

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  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
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  2. (U) As a matter of course, the NSA cannot publicly confirm or deny whether any
    individual is subject to surveillance activities because to do so would tend to reveal actual
    targets. For example, if the NSA were to confirm in this case and others that specific individuals
    [REDACTED]
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Footnote 16: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
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Footnote 17: (TS//SI//OC/NF) NSA has estimated that it collects Internet metadata associated with
approximately [REDACTED].
[REDACTED] With respect to telephony meta data, NSA has previously estimated that, prior to the
2006 FISC Order, about [REDACTED] telephony meta data records was presented to an
analyst for review, see *Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith
B. Alexander* in Shubert, et al. v. Bush, et al., (Case No. 07-cv-693) (dated May 25, 2007) ¶ 27,
and the scope of that disparity remains generally the same.

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
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are not targets of surveillance, but later refuse to comment (as it would have to) in a case
involving an actual target, an actual or potential adversary of the United States could easily
deduce by comparing such responses that the person in the latter case is a target. There can be
great harm in revealing targets of foreign intelligence surveillance. If an individual knows or
suspects he is a target of U.S. intelligence activities, he would naturally tend to alter his behavior
to take new precautions against surveillance. In addition, revealing who is not a target would
indicate who has avoided surveillance and reveal the limitations of NSA's capabilities. Such
information could lead an actual or potential adversary, secure in the knowledge that he is not
under surveillance, to convey information; alternatively, such a person may be unwittingly
utilized or even forced to convey information through a secure channel to a hostile foreign
adversary. In short, revealing which channels are free from surveillance and which are not
would also reveal sensitive intelligence methods and thereby could help any adversary evade
detection and capitalize on limitations in NSA's capabilities. ¹⁸

  1. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
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Footnote 18: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]

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B. (U) Information Related to NSA Activities, Sources, or Methods Implicated by the
Plaintiffs' Allegations and the Harm to National Security of Its Disclosure.

  1. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations of a Communications Dragnet.
  1. (U) I am also supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege and asserting the NSA's
    statutory privilege over any other facts concerning NSA intelligence activities, sources, or
    methods that may relate to or be necessary to litigate the plaintiffs' claims and allegations,
    including that (i) the NSA is indiscriminately intercepting the content of communications of
    millions of ordinary Americans, see, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, and (ii) that the NSA is
    collecting the private telephone and Internet transaction records of millions of AT&T customers,
    again including information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications.
    See e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 13, 82-97. As described above, the scope of the government's
    privilege assertion includes but is not limited to: (1) facts concerning the operation of the now
    inoperative Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other NSA activities needed to demonstrate
    that the TSP was limited to the interception of the content of one-end international
    communications reasonably believed to involve a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
    terrorist organization and that the NSA does not otherwise conduct the content surveillance
    dragnet that the plaintiffs allege; and (2) information concerning whether or not the NSA obtains
    transactional communication records from telecommunications companies such as AT&T as
    [REDACTED].

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
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plaintiffs allege. As set forth below, the disclosure of such information would cause
exceptionally grave harm to national security.

(a) (U) Information Related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program.

  1. (U) After the existence of the TSP was officially acknowledged in December
    2005, the Government stated that the NSA's collection of the content of communications under
    the TSP was directed at international communications in which a participant was reasonably
    believed to be associated with al Qaeda or an affiliated organization. Plaintiffs' allegation that
    the NSA undertakes indiscriminate surveillance of the content of millions of
    communications sent or received by people inside the United States under the TSP is
    therefore false, again as the Government has previously stated.¹⁹ But to the extent the NSA must
    demonstrate that content surveillance under the TSP was so limited, and was not plaintiffs'
    alleged content dragnet, or demonstrate that the NSA has not otherwise engaged in the alleged
    content dragnet, highly classified NSA intelligence sources and methods about the operation of
    the TSP and NSA intelligence activities would be subject to disclosure or the risk of disclosure.
    The disclosure of whether and to what extent the NSA utilizes certain intelligence sources and
    methods would reveal to foreign adversaries the NSA's capabilities, or lack thereof, enabling
    them to either evade particular channels of communications that are being monitored, or exploit
    channels of communications that are not subject to NSA activities—in either case risking
    exceptionally grave harm to national security.
  1. (U) The privileged information that must be protected from disclosure includes
    the following classified details concerning content surveillance under the now inoperative TSP.
  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) First, interception of the content of communications
    under the TSP was triggered by a range of information, including sensitive foreign intelligence,

Footnote 19: See, e.g., Public Declaration of NSA Director Alexander in the Shubert action (07-cv-
693-VRW) at ¶ 16.

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obtained or derived from various sources indicating that a particular phone number or email
address is reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence Community to be associated with a
member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. Professional intelligence
officers at the NSA undertook a careful but expeditious analysis of that information, and
considered a number of possible factors, in determining whether it would be appropriate to target
a telephone number or email address under the TSP. Those factors included whether the target
phone number or email address was: (1) reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence
Community, based on other authorized collection activities or other law enforcement or
intelligence sources, to be used by a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
organization; [REDACTED].
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Footnote 20: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]

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40. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) Once the NSA determined that there were reasonable
grounds to believe that the target is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
organization, the NSA took steps to focus the interception on the specific al Qaeda-related target
and on communications of that target that were to or from a foreign country. In this respect, the
NSA's collection efforts were [REDACTED] that the NSA had
reasonable grounds to believe carry the "one-end" foreign communications of members or agents
of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations.

  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) The NSA took specific steps in the actual TSP
    interception process to minimize the risk that the communications of non-targets were
    intercepted. With respect to telephone communications, specific telephone numbers identified
    through the analysis outlined above were [REDACTED] so that the only communications
    intercepted were those to or from the targeted number of an individual who was reasonably
    believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) For the interception of the content of Internet
    communications under the TSP, the NSA used identifying information obtained through its
    analysis of the target, such as email addresses [REDACTED] to target for collection the
    communications of individuals reasonably believed to be members or agents of al Qaeda or an
    affiliated terrorist organization.
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]

Footnote 21: (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The NSA did not search the content of the
communications [REDACTED] with "key words" other than the targeted selectors [REDACTED]
themselves. Rather, the NSA targeted for collection only email addresses [REDACTED]
associated with suspected members or agents of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist [REDACTED]
organizations, or communications in which such [REDACTED] were mentioned. In
addition, due to technical limitations of the hardware and software, incidental collection of non-
target communications has occurred, and in such circumstances the NSA applies its
minimization procedures to ensure that communications of non-targets are not disseminated. To
the extent such facts would be necessary to dispel plaintiffs' erroneous content dragnet
allegations, they could not be disclosed without revealing highly sensitive intelligence methods.

  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to procedures designed to ensure that the TSP
    was limited to the international communications of al Qaeda members and affiliates, the NSA
    also took additional steps to ensure that the privacy rights of U.S. persons were protected.
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
46. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The
foregoing information about the targeted scope of content collection under the TSP could not be
disclosed, in order to address and rebut plaintiffs' allegation that the NSA, with the assistance of
AT&T, engaged in the alleged content dragnet, without revealing specific NSA sources and
methods and thereby causing exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

Footnote 22: (U//FOUO) In addition, in implementing the TSP, the NSA applied the existing Legal
Compliance and Minimization Procedures applicable to U.S. persons to the extent not
inconsistent with the presidential authorization. See United States Signals Intelligence Directive
(USSID) 18. These procedures require that the NSA refrain from intentionally acquiring the
communications of U.S. persons who are not the targets of its surveillance activities, that it
destroy upon recognition any communications solely between or among persons in the U.S. that
it inadvertently acquires, and that it refrain from identifying U.S. persons in its intelligence
reports unless a senior NSA official determines that the recipient of the report requires such
information in order to perform a lawful function assigned to it and the identity of the U.S.
person is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to assess its significance.

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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47. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In addition to these facts about the TSP, facts about other
NSA intelligence activities would be needed to address or prove that the NSA does not conduct
the alleged content dragnet.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In short, there is no other "dragnet" program authorized by the President after 9/11
under which the NSA intercepts the content of virtually all domestic and international
communications as the plaintiffs allege. Again, however, information about NSA content
surveillance activities beyond the TSP could not be disclosed in order to address and rebut
plaintiffs' allegation without revealing specific NSA sources and methods and thereby causing
exceptionally grave damage to national security.²³

(b) (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations Concerning the Collection of Communication
Records.

  1. (U) As noted above, plaintiffs also allege that the NSA is collecting the private
    telephone and Internet transaction records of millions of AT&T customers, again including
    information concerning the plaintiffs' telephone and Internet communications. See, e.g.,
    [REDACTED].

Footnote 23: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) To the extent relevant to this case, additional facts about the
operational details of the TSP and subsequent FISA authorized content surveillance activities
also could not be disclosed without exceptional harm to national security, including for example
information that would demonstrate the operational swiftness and effectiveness of utilizing
content surveillance in conjunction with the meta data activities. As noted, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the TSP, in conjunction with meta data
collection and analysis described herein, allowed the NSA to obtain rapidly not only the content of
a particular communication, but connections between that target and others who may form a web
of al Qaeda conspirators.

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 13, 82-97. Confirmation or denial of any information concerning whether
the NSA collects communication records would also disclose information about whether or not
the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, the NSA's capabilities or
lack thereof, and would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In addition to implicating the NSA's content collection
    activities authorized after the 9/11 attacks, the plaintiffs' allegations also put directly at issue the
    NSA's bulk collection of non-content communication meta data. As explained above, the NSA
    has not engaged in the alleged dragnet of communication content, and, as now explained below,
    to address plaintiffs' allegations concerning the bulk collection of non-content information
    would require disclosure of NSA sources and methods that would cause exceptional harm to
    national security. As also explained herein, these meta data collection activities are now subject
    to the orders and supervision of the FISC.
  1. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) As noted above, starting in October 2001, and since
    2004 pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order, the NSA collected bulk meta data associated with
    electronic communications [REDACTED].
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    See ¶¶ 25, 28, supra.²⁴

Footnote 24: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED] pursuant to the FISC Telephone Records Order, certain telecommunication companies
provide the NSA with bulk telephony meta data in the form of call detail records derived from
information kept by those companies in the ordinary course of business. See ¶¶ 25, 27, supra.

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) The bulk meta data collection activities that have been
    undertaken by the NSA since 9/11 are vital tools for protecting the United States from another
    catastrophic terrorist attack. Disclosure of these meta data activities, sources, or methods would
    cause exceptionally grave harm to national security. It is not possible to target collection solely
    on known terrorist telephone identifiers and effectively discover the existence, location, and
    plans of terrorist adversaries.
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED]
The only effective means by which NSA analysts are able continuously
to keep track of such operatives is through meta data collection and analysis.

(TS//SI) Technical Details of Analytic Capabilities

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) In particular, the bulk collection of Internet and telephony meta
    data allows the NSA to use critical and unique analytical capabilities to track the contacts [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED] through the use of two highly sophisticated tools known as "contact-chaining" [REDACTED].
    Contact-chaining allows the NSA to identify telephone numbers and email addresses
    that have been in contact with known [REDACTED] numbers and addresses; in turn, those
    contacts can be targeted for immediate query and analysis as new [REDACTED] numbers
    and addresses are identified. When the NSA performs a contact-chaining query on a terrorist-
    associated telephone identifier, [REDACTED].
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
  1. (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF)—Because it is impossible to determine in advance
    which particular piece of meta data will turn out to identify a terrorist, collecting meta data in
    bulk is vital for the success of contact-chaining. [REDACTED] NSA analysts know that the
    terrorists' telephone calls are located somewhere in the billions of data bits; what they cannot

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED] know ahead of time is exactly where. The ability to accumulate meta data substantially increases
NSA's ability to detection and identify these targets. One particular advantage of bulk meta data
collection is that it provides a historical perspective on past contact activity that cannot be
captured in the present or prospectively. Such historical links may be vital to identifying new
targets, because the meta data may contain links that are absolutely unique, pointing to potential
targets that otherwise would be missed.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] These sources and methods enable the NSA to segregate some of that very
small amount of otherwise undetectable but highly valuable information from the overwhelming
amount of other information that has no intelligence value whatsoever—in colloquial terms, to
find at least some of the needles hidden in the haystack. If employed on a sufficient volume of
data, contact chaining [REDACTED] can expose [REDACTED] and contacts
that were previously unknown. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

  1. (TS//SI//NF) The foregoing discussion is not hypothetical. As noted previously,
    since inception of the first FISC Telephone Business Records Order, NSA has provided 275
    reports to the FBI. These reports have provided a total of 2,549 telephone identifiers as being in
    contact with identifiers associated with [REDACTED].
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Accordingly, adjudication of plaintiffs' allegations concerning
    the collection of non-content meta data and records about communication transactions would risk
    or require disclosure of critical NSA sources and methods for [REDACTED] contacts of
    terrorist communications as well as the existence of current NSA activities under FISC Orders.
    Despite media speculation about these activities, official confirmation and disclosure of the
    NSA's bulk collection and targeted analysis of telephony meta data would confirm to all of our
    foreign adversaries [REDACTED] the existence of these critical intelligence
    capabilities and thereby severely undermine NSA's ability to gather information concerning
    terrorist connections and cause exceptional harm to national security.
  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) Information Concerning Current FISA Authorized
    Activities and Specific FISC Orders.
  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) I am also supporting the DNI's state secrets privilege
    assertion, and asserting NSA's statutory privilege, over information concerning the various
    orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court mentioned throughout this declaration that
    authorize NSA intelligence collection activities, as well as NSA surveillance activities conducted
    pursuant to the Protect America Act ("PAA") and current activities authorized by the FISA
    Amendments Act of 2008. As noted herein, the three NSA intelligence activities initiated after
    the September 11 attacks to detect and prevent a further al Qaeda attack—(i) content collection
    of targeted al Qaeda and associated terrorist-related communications under what later was called
    the TSP; (ii) internet meta data bulk collection; and (iii) telephony meta data bulk collection—
    have been subject to various orders of the FISC (as well as FISA statutory authority) and are no

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN
longer being conducted under presidential authorization. The bulk collection of non-content
transactional data for internet communications was first authorized by the FISC in the July 2004
FISC Pen Register Order, and the bulk collection of non-content telephony meta data was first
authorized by the FISC in May 2006. The existence and operational details of these orders, and
of subsequent FISC orders reauthorizing these activities, remain highly classified and disclosure
of this information would cause exceptional harm to national security.²⁵ In addition, while the
Government has acknowledged the general existence of the January 10, 2007 FISC Orders
authorizing electronic surveillance similar to that undertaken in the TSP, the content of those
orders, and facts concerning the NSA sources and methods they authorize, cannot be disclosed
without likewise causing exceptional harm to national security. Subsequent content surveillance
sources and methods utilized by the NSA under the PAA and, currently, under the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 likewise cannot be disclosed. I summarize below the proceedings that
have occurred under authority of the FISA or the FISC.

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) (a) Internet Meta Data: Pursuant to the FISC Pen Register
    Order, which has been reauthorized approximately every 90 days after it was first issued, NSA is
    authorized to collect in bulk [REDACTED] meta data associated with
    electronic communications [REDACTED].
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]

Footnote 25: (TS//SI//OC/NF) For this reason, the FISC Telephone Business Records Order and
FISC Pen Register Orders prohibit any person from disclosing to any other person that the NSA
has sought or obtained the telephony meta data, other than (a) those persons to whom
disclosure is necessary to comply with the Order; (b) an attorney to obtain legal advice or
assistance with respect to the production of meta data in response to the Order; or (c) other
persons as permitted by the Director of the FBI or the Director's designee. The FISC Orders
further provide that any person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to (a), (b), or (c) shall be
subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to whom the Order is directed in
the same manner as such person.

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The NSA is authorized to query the archived
meta data collected pursuant to the FISC Pen Register Order using email addresses for which
there were facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email
address was associated with [REDACTED]. The FISC Pen Register
Order was most recently reauthorized on [REDACTED] 2009, and requires continued assistance by the
providers through [REDACTED] 2009.

  1. (TS//SI//OC//NF) (b) Telephony Meta Data: Beginning in May 2006, the NSA's
    bulk collection of telephony meta data, previously subject to presidential authorization, was
    authorized by the FISC Telephone Business Records Order. Like the FISC Pen Register Order,
    the FISC Telephone Business Records Order was reauthorized approximately every 90 days.
    Based on the finding that reasonable grounds existed that the production was relevant to efforts
    to protect against international terrorism, the Order required [REDACTED] to
    produce to the NSA "call detail records" or "telephony metadata" pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §
    1861[c] (authorizing the production of business records for, inter alia, an investigation to protect
    against international terrorism). Telephony meta data was compiled from call detail data
    maintained by the providers in the ordinary course of business that reflected non-content
    information such as the date, time, and duration of telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers
    used to place and receive the calls. The NSA was authorized by the FISC to query the archived
    telephony meta data solely with identified telephone numbers for which there were facts giving
    Footnote 26: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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[REDACTED] rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number was associated with [REDACTED].
(or a "RAS" determination). The FISC Telephone Business
Records Order was most recently reauthorized on March 2, 2009, but subject to new specific
limitations, which I summarize next.

  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) As noted above (note 11 supra), on January 15, 2009, the
    Department of Justice ("DOJ") submitted a compliance incident report related to the Business
    Records Order to the FISC, based on information provided to DOJ by the NSA, which indicated
    that the NSA's prior reports to the FISC concerning implementation of the FISC Telephone
    Business Records Order had not accurately reported the extent to which NSA had been querying
    the telephony meta data acquired from carriers. In sum, this compliance incident related to a
    process whereby currently tasked telephony selectors (i.e. phone numbers) reasonably believed
    to be associated with authorized counter terrorism foreign intelligence targets associated with
    [REDACTED] under Executive Order 12333 were reviewed against
    the incoming telephony metadata to determine if that number had been in contact with a number
    in the United States. This process occurred prior to a formal determination by NSA that
    reasonable articulable suspicion existed that the selector was associated with [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED] and was not consistent with NSA's prior descriptions of the
    process for querying telephony meta data.
  1. (TS//SI//OC/NF) By Order dated March 2, 2009, the FISC has directed that the
    NSA may continue to acquire call detail records of telephony meta data in accordance with the
    FISC Telephone Business Record Orders, but is prohibited from accessing data acquired except
    in a limited manner. In particular, the Government may request through a motion that the FISC
    authorize querying of the telephony meta data for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence on a
    case-by-case basis (unless otherwise necessary to protect against imminent threat to human life,

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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subject to report to the FISC the next business day). In addition, the FISC imposed other
obligations on the Government, including to report on its ongoing review of the matter and to file
affidavits describing the continuing value of the telephony meta data collection to the national
security of the United States and to certify that the information sought is relevant to an
authorized investigation.

  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC//NF) NSA is committed to working with the FISC
    on this and other compliance issues to ensure that this vital intelligence tool works appropriately
    and effectively. For purposes of this litigation, and the privilege assertions now made by the
    DNI and by the NSA, the intelligence sources and methods described herein remain highly
    classified and the disclosure that [REDACTED] would
    compromise vital NSA sources and methods and result in exceptionally grave harm to national
    security.
  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC//NF) (c) Content Collection: On January 10, 2007, the FISC
    issued orders authorizing the Government to conduct certain electronic surveillance that had
    been occurring under the TSP. Those Orders included [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED] the "Foreign Telephone and Email Order," which
    authorized, inter alia, electronic surveillance of telephone and Internet communications
    [REDACTED] where the Government determined that there was probable
    cause to believe that (1) one of the communicants is a member or agent of [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED] and (2) the communication is to or from a foreign country (i.e.,

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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a one-end foreign communication to or from the United States). Thereafter, any electronic
surveillance that was occurring as part of the TSP became subject to the approval of the FISA
Court and the TSP was not reauthorized.²⁷

  1. (TS//SI//OC//NF) The Foreign Telephone and Email Order remained in effect
    until the Protect America Act ("PAA") was enacted in August 2007. Under the PAA, the FISA's
    definition of "electronic surveillance" was clarified to exclude "surveillance directed at a person
    reasonably believed to be located outside the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1805A. The PAA
    authorized the DNI and the Attorney General to jointly "authorize the acquisition of
    foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the
    United States" for up to one year, id. § 1805B(a), and to issue directives to communications
    service providers requiring them to "immediately provide the Government with all information,
    facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition" of necessary intelligence
    information, id. § 1805B(e). Such directives were issued [REDACTED] and the NSA conducted
    content surveillance of overseas targets under the PAA [REDACTED].
  1. (TS//SI//OC//NF) Beginning in [REDACTED] 2008, expiring directives that had been
    issued under the PAA for content surveillance of overseas targets (including surveillance of
    specific [REDACTED] targets overseas) were replaced by new directives for such surveillance
    [REDACTED].

Footnote 27: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. [REDACTED] authorizes the targeting of persons outside of the United States without individual FISC
orders but subject to directives issued to carriers by the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General under Section 702(h) of the FISA for the continuation of overseas surveillance
under this new authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h) (as added by the FISA Act of 2008, P.L.
110-261).

  1. (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In sum, the post-9/11 content surveillance activities
    undertaken by the NSA evolved from the presidentially authorized TSP to the FISC Foreign
    Telephone and Email Order, to the directives issued under the PAA and, ultimately, to the
    directives that are now being issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Each
    authorization sought to enable the NSA to undertake surveillance on numerous multiple targets
    overseas without the need to obtain advance court approval for each target, but none has entailed
    the kind of indiscriminate content surveillance on telephony and Internet communications that
    the plaintiffs allege.
  1. (U) Plaintiffs' Allegations that AT&T Provided Assistance to the NSA with
    the Alleged Activities.
  1. (U) The third major category of NSA intelligence sources and methods as to
    which I am supporting the DNI's assertion of privilege, and asserting the NSA's statutory
    privilege, concerns information that may tend to confirm or deny whether or not AT&T (or to the
    extent necessary whether or not any other telecommunications provider) has assisted the NSA
    with alleged intelligence activities. Plaintiffs allege that they are customers of AT&T, and that
    AT&T participated in the alleged surveillance activities that the plaintiffs seek to challenge. As
    set forth below, confirmation or denial of a relationship between the NSA and AT&T (or other
    carriers) on alleged intelligence activities would cause exceptionally grave harm to national [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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security.

  1. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) Because the NSA is not engaged in the
    indiscriminate dragnet of the content of domestic and international communications as the
    plaintiffs allege, [REDACTED]
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    [REDACTED] can reasonably be
    expected to cause exceptionally grave harm to national security.
  1. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]
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Footnote 28: (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) On September 19, 2008, then-Attorney General
Mukasey submitted a classified declaration and certification to this Court authorized by Section
802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008, see 50 U.S.C.
§ 1885a, [REDACTED].

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Footnote 30: (TS//SI//OC/NF) [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Footnote 31: (TS//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) [REDACTED]

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP-SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

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VII. (U) Risks of Allowing Litigation to Proceed

  1. (TS//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//OC/NF) Upon examination of the allegations, claims,
    facts, and issues raised by this case, it is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to
    the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will substantially risk the
    disclosure of the privileged state secrets described above. Although plaintiffs' alleged content
    surveillance dragnet does not occur, proving why that is so, [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED] would directly implicate highly classified
    intelligence information and activities. Similarly, attempting to address plaintiffs' allegations
    with respect to the bulk collection of non-content information and records containing
    transactional meta data about communications would also compromise currently operative NSA
    sources and methods that are essential to protecting national security, including for detecting and
    preventing a terrorist attack. [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED]
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    [REDACTED]
    [REDACTED] In
    my judgment, any effort to probe the outer-bounds of such classified information would pose
    [REDACTED]

Footnote 35: (TS//TSP//SI//OC/NF) In its prior classified declarations in this action, the NSA has
set forth specific examples of how the intelligence sources and methods utilized by the NSA
after the 9/11 attacks, including content surveillance under the TSP and pursuant to subsequent
FISA authority, as well as non-content meta data collection and analysis, have led to the
development by the NSA of actionable intelligence and important counter-terrorism efforts. See.
e.g., Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of LTG Keith B. Alexander in *Shubert, et al. v.
Bush, et al.* (Case No. 07-cv-693) (dated May 25, 2007) at 35-43, ¶¶ 58-61. To the extent that
such information would be relevant to any litigation in this action, however, they could not be
disclosed without revealing specific NSA intelligence information, sources, and methods, and are
subject to the government's privilege assertion.

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//WORCON/NOFORN
[REDACTED] inherent and significant risks of the disclosure of that information, including critically sensitive
information about NSA sources, methods, operations, targets [REDACTED]. Indeed, any
effort merely to allude to those facts in a non-classified fashion could be revealing of classified
details that should not be disclosed. Even seemingly minor or innocuous facts, in the context of
this case or other non-classified information, can tend to reveal, particularly to sophisticated
foreign adversaries, a much bigger picture of U.S. intelligence gathering sources and methods.

  1. (TS//SI//NF) The United States has an overwhelming interest in detecting and
    thwarting further mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda. The United States has already suffered one
    attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's financial center for days, and successfully
    struck at the command and control center for the Nation's military. Al Qaeda continues to
    possess the ability and clear, stated intent to carry out a massive attack in the United States that
    could result in a significant loss of life, as well as have a devastating impact on the U.S.
    economy. According to the most recent intelligence analysis, attacking the U.S. Homeland
    remains one of al Qaeda's top operational priorities, see Classified In Camera Ex Parte
    Declaration of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and al Qaeda will
    keep trying for high-impact attacks as long as its central command structure is functioning and
    affiliated groups are capable of furthering its interests.
  1. (TS//SI//NF) Al Qaeda seeks to use our own communications infrastructure
    against us as they secretly attempt to infiltrate agents into the United States, waiting to attack at a
    time of their choosing. One of the greatest challenges the United States confronts in the ongoing
    effort to prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack against the Homeland is the critical need to
    gather intelligence quickly and effectively. Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks,
    and the government faces significant obstacles in finding and tracking agents of al Qaeda as they
    manipulate modern technology in an attempt to communicate while remaining undetected. The

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN

TOP SECRET//TSP//SI-[REDACTED]//MORCON NOFORN
NSA sources, methods, and activities described herein are vital tools in this effort.

VIII. (U) Conclusion

  1. (U) In sum, I support the DNI's assertion of the state secrets privilege and
    statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure of the information described herein and detailed
    herein. I also assert a statutory privilege under Section 6 of the National Security Act with
    respect to the information described herein which concerns the functions of the NSA. Moreover,
    because proceedings in this case risk disclosure of privileged and classified intelligence-related
    information, I respectfully request that the Court not only protect that information from
    disclosure but also dismiss this case to prevent exceptional harm to the national security of the
    United States.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATE: 3 April 2009

DEBORAH A. BONANNI
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency

Classified In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration of Deborah A. Bonanni, National Security Agency
Carolyn Jewel, et al. v. National Security Agency, et al. (No. 08-cv-4873-VRW)
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