August 17, 2006 NSA Presentation for the FISC

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2006-08-17
Type: FOIA
Pages: 20
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: NOFORN, MR
ACLU,EFF ↗2013-11-18

An NSA presentation for the FISC on the bulk telephony metadata program pursuant to Section 501 of FISA and notification of two compliance issues concerning the collection. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.

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ACLU_-_August_17_2006_NSA_Presentation_for_the_FISC

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NSA REPORT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
(BR 06-05) (TS//SI//NF)

(TS//SI//NF) The National Security Agency (NSA)
submits this report as required by the May 24, 2006 Order
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),
Docket Number BR 06-05, which authorized NSA to acquire
certain tangible things in connection with investigations
to protect against international terrorism concerning
[REDACTED] pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, as amended (the "Act"), 50 U.S.C. § 1861.

BACKGROUND (U)

(TS//SI//NF) On May 24, 2006, the FISC issued an
Order authorizing NSA to acquire certain tangible things
"call detail records" maintained by
[REDACTED] in connection with
investigations to protect against international terrorism
concerning [REDACTED] pursuant to the Act.1 The Court's Order
requires that any application to renew or reinstate the
authority shall include a report describing (i) the queries
that have been made since this Order was granted; (ii) the
manner in which NSA applied the procedures set forth in
subparagraph A (which describes the access control and the

1 (TS//SI//NF) "Call detail records," or "telephony metadata," were
defined in NSA's declaration, and similarly in the Court's Order, to
include comprehensive communications routing information, including but
not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and
terminating telephone number, communications device identifier, etc.),
trunk identifier, and time and duration of call, but not to include the
substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §
2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber
or customer.

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standard for querying the data); and (iii) any proposed
changes in the way in which call-detail records would be
received [REDACTED] See Docket Number BR 06-05 at
9 (para. 4.I). This report addresses the period between May
24, 2006 and August 2, 2006, a cut-off date that was
selected in order to allow for the gathering of data and
composition of the report; the next report will address a
period beginning with August 3, 2006. Because the cut-off
date is prior to the date of the Court's August 8, 2006
Amended Order in this matter, this report does not discuss
NSA's activities under that Amended Order.
(TS//SI//NF)

ROLE OF DATA INTEGRITY ANALYSTS (C)

(TS//SI//NF) As an initial matter, NSA wants to
clarify the fact that a small team of analysts who have
access to the data acquired pursuant to the Order do not
engage in call-chaining analysis for the purpose of
discovering terrorist suspects and disseminating
information to other appropriate elements of the
Government; rather, their function is to support such
efforts by continually assuring the quality, accuracy and
utility of the information received. Because these
analysts access the acquired data before it is archived
into the analytic database, and do not conduct the
operational analysis that has been detailed for the Court
in accordance with the standard provided by the Court, NSA
believes it important to highlight with particularity their
role in the analytic process.

(TS/SI//NF) The successful use of the call-detail
records acquired under the Order is made possible in part
through the efforts of a small team of "data integrity"
analysts. This team currently consisting of four

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individuals - has access to -- and does access -- the data
acquired under the Order before it is archived into the
database used by intelligence analysts to carry out their
counter terrorism mission. The data integrity analysts
work with the [REDACTED] providing the data to NSA and with
the data itself to ensure NSA understands what data it is
receiving, how the fields of data are arranged, what is
contained in them, how they are used by the [REDACTED] and
similar issues concerning the delivery of the data to NSA.
These analysts also write software that facilitates the
normalization and archiving of the incoming data into the
NSA analytic database, review the incoming records for
problems and irregularities, and generally ensure the
quality of the data archived for operational purposes.
These individuals are expert in the data itself, rather
than in drawing conclusions about individuals based on the
data.

(TS//SI//NF) The data integrity analysts do not query
the archived data to perform intelligence analysis, but
their role in supporting that analysis is a crucial one.2
These data integrity analysts have been trained by NSA
management and by the NSA Office of General Counsel in the
appropriate handling of the data, the purpose for and
conditions under which NSA receives it, and the limitations
and conditions on its storage and use. The Government's
filings seeking renewal of the Order make specific
reference to the unique role of the data integrity analysis
team.

2 (TS//SI//NF) Indeed, it was through the efforts and attention of the
data integrity analysts that the presence of credit card information in
a small percentage of the records, discussed below, became known to NSA
management.

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CALL DETAIL RECORDS ACQUIRED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S
ORDER, AND REPORTABLE ISSUES CONCERNING THEM (S)

a. The Records (U)

(TS//SI//NF) Pursuant to the Court's Order, NSA was
authorized to acquire call detail records from
[REDACTED] companies, and during this reporting period acquired such
records from [REDACTED] companies, [REDACTED] The call
detail records of [REDACTED] companies [REDACTED]

(TS//SI//NF) In all cases, the records consist of
numerous data fields that provide information about
telephone calls, but do not contain the content of any
calls as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2510(8). The fields of data
in the records contain information such as the telephone
number of the device initiating the call, the telephone
number of the device that was called, the date and duration
of the call, the identifiers assigned to the communications
trunks that carried the call, whether a call originated or
terminated overseas, [REDACTED]

3 (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] It is
referred to throughout this report a [REDACTED] subject to the Court's Order in BR 06-
05, [REDACTED] to effect delivery of its call detail records.

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(TS//SI//NF) Often, numerous fields within a call
detail record contain no information. Some fields
contained in a call detail record, such as the field
indicating the called number, almost always contain data.
Other fields, such as the field indicating [REDACTED]
only contain data when the field is relevant to the
particular call in question - in this case when the call
[REDACTED] The number of fields in a
record varies depending on which company provided it and
which set of the company's records it belongs to;
accordingly, the number of fields in a record varies from
[REDACTED]

(TS//SI//NF) One field NSA has found particularly
useful in making associations among users of telephone
numbers is a field that [REDACTED]
field and that [REDACTED]
field. This field is sometimes blank, but sometimes
contains a [REDACTED] indicating that
the telephone call was made using [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
by [REDACTED]
NSA submits that [REDACTED] do not constitute [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the current
application specifically seeks authority to obtain and use
[REDACTED]

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b. Reportable Issues During This Period (U)

(e) Before elaborating on its application of the
standard used to conduct searches of the archived call
detail records, NSA wishes to bring to the Court's
attention two issues that arose during the initial period
the Order was in effect.

(TS//SI/NF) NSA averred in its Declaration in support
of the Government's application for tangible things that
the term "call detail records" would not include the
substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial
information of a subscriber or customer. The Court's Order
adopted similar language to describe the limits of its
authorization. Docket Number BR 06-05 at 2 (para. 2).

(TS//SI//NF) A very small percentage of the call
detail records did, however, contain a 16-digit credit card
number in those cases when the caller selected a credit
card as the payment method for the call. In addition, some
records contained proper names - in some cases just a first
name, and in some a first and a last name - when the
calling party sought to place a collect call.

(TS//SI//NF) While NSA OGC advised that it believes
that the restrictions contained in the Court's Order were
not designed to prevent NSA from receiving the particular
information discussed below in the context it was received,
the credit card numbers are at least arguably financial
information, and the names are clearly names. NSA
[REDACTED]

4 (TS//SI//NF) Upon notification of the facts surrounding the inclusion
of the credit cards numbers as described, the NSA OGC advised that it
was not persuaded that the inclusion of the 16-digit string of numbers
in these records was unauthorized under the Order's terms. NSA OGC
opined that a credit card number, standing alone, does not indicate.

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describes below the conditions surrounding its receipt of
this information, the steps taken to eradicate it, and the
current status of the records with respect to such
information.

  1. Credit card numbers in certain records
    (TS//SI//NF) (S)

(TS//CI//NF) A very small percentage of the records
NSA acquired between May 24 and August 2 - approximately
0.001% - contained credit card numbers in one of the
fields. NSA did not make use of this information in any
way. Upon recognizing that this information could be
considered financial information, NSA management directed
that software be written immediately to suppress - or mask

  • the digits in the archived data whenever a 16-digit
    string of numbers appeared in the relevant field. This was
    accomplished on June 19, ensuring that NSA analysts
    querying the archived data could neither see the credit
    card information nor make use of it in their analysis.

(TS//SI//NF) At the same time, NSA representatives
initiated contact with [REDACTED] to request that the
[REDACTED] stop sending information in the relevant data
field whenever the contents of the field consisted of a 16-

anything about the financial situation, purchasing habits, payment
record, or any other such private information concerning a customer or
subscriber. NSA OGC believes it is this type of private information
about the finances of U.S. persons that the Court sought to protect in
its Order, rather than the mechanism used to pay for a particular
telephone call. Nonetheless, NSA OGC recognizes there exists a
respectable argument that a credit card number is financial
information, and also recognizes that such information could be used to
derive more private information about an individual; therefore, NSA OGC
believes it imperative to bring the issue to the Court's attention. As
is set out above, NSA never did any analysis or took any other action
with respect to the credit card numbers, and rendered the credit card
numbers inaccessible to operational analysts 26 days after the Order
was signed.

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digit number. On July 10, [REDACTED] stopped providing the
16-digit string [REDACTED] NSA and [REDACTED]
continue to take steps aimed at terminating the
delivery to NSA of similar information.5 Again,
however, the NSA analysts conducting searches of the
archived data have not had credit card numbers available to
them since June 19, 2006. Moreover, no record exists of
any analyst having made any use of the credit card numbers,
and no NSA methods would have called upon them to do so.

  1. Proper Names in some records (S)

(TS//SI//NF) In addition, a field [REDACTED]
which is normally blank, in a small
number of instances contained a proper name. This occurred
even less frequently than the 0.001% frequency with which
credit card numbers appeared, evidently when the calling
party sought to place a collect call. When the field
contained a proper name, it was sometimes a first name
only, and sometimes both a first and last name.

5 (TS//SI//NF) Achieving this without endangering the operation is
somewhat complicated. NSA data integrity analysts (discussed above)
have written software that helps load the call detail records into the
NSA database used to search the archived data. Part of that software's
function is to "recognize" a field for what it is, and treat it
accordingly in organizing the data for use. NSA cannot simply ask the
company to summarily eliminate the field without a likely disruption of
its operations, for two reasons: first, as discussed above, with
respect to the vast majority of call detail records, the field does not
contain credit card information, and does contain useful information
that permits the association of previously unassociated individuals;
second, because NSA data integrity analysts have written software that
moves the information acquired pursuant to the Order into the database
in which the archived data is searched, and because that software
"recognizes" a particular number of fields and the contents of each
with respect to the different types of records, the precipitous
elimination of a field would likely disrupt the functioning of the
system, treating data from one field as though it were data from
another field. As was stated above, however, NSA analysts conducting
searches of the archived data do not have access to the credit card
information, and have never made use of it.

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(TS//SI//NF) As was the case with respect to credit
card information, when NSA recognized that it was receiving
proper names in a small number of records and that this
fact was significant under the Order, it took immediate
steps along two paths: at the direction of management,
software was implemented on June 19 to suppress from view
the proper names that appeared in the archived data queried
by the analysts, and NSA officials worked with
[REDACTED] officials to curtail delivery of such information. On July
9, procedures were implemented that precluded completely
the delivery of proper names in the records
[REDACTED] provided to NSA. NSA no longer receives proper names from
[REDACTED] and the proper names it did receive have been
masked from the view of analysts. NSA never received
similar information from [REDACTED]

THE STANDARD SET OUT IN THE COURT'S ORDER (U)

(TS//SI//NF) The standard set out by the Court for the
purpose of querying data acquired pursuant to the
authorization and referred to for purposes of the required
report is as follows:

"[a]ny search or analysis of the data archive shall
occur only after a particular known telephone number
has been associated with [REDACTED] More specifically, access to
the archived data shall occur only when NSA has
identified a known telephone number for which, based
on the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons
act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the telephone number is
associated with [REDACTED] provided, however, that a
telephone number believed to be used by a U.S. person

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shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the
basis of activities that are protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution." See Docket Number BR
06-05 at 5 (para 4.A).

NSA ACTIVITIES UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE
COURT'S MAY 24, 2006 ORDER (TS//SI//NF)

(TS//SI//NF) The Court's Order instructed the NSA
Office of General Counsel to brief analysts with respect to
the authorization granted by the Order, and the limited
circumstances in which queries of the archive are
permitted, as well as other procedures and restrictions
regarding the retrieval, storage and dissemination of the
archived data. See BR 06-05 at 6 (para 4.C).

a. OGC Briefings

(TS//SI//NF) During this period, NSA'S OGC conducted
formal briefings at three different sessions, at least one
of which was attended by every analyst authorized to query
the archived data, as well as each the seven individuals
authorized to approve queries of the archived data. These
briefings consisted of descriptions of the retrieval,
storage and dissemination procedures and restrictions
included in the Court's Order, as well as a description of
the standard applicable to the processing of information in
the archive and legal advice concerning its application.
In addition to the scheduled formal briefings, NSA'S OGC
also provided frequent advice and counsel on these and
similar topics throughout the period to analysts applying
the standard and to members of management responsible for
approving requests to query the archived data.

(TS//SI//NF) In addition, as NSA makes clear above and
in its application for renewal and accompanying

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declaration, a small team of "data integrity" analysts
ensure the quality of the call detail records prior to
their inclusion in the NSA analytic database. Because they
have access to the data, NSA required them to attend one of
the above briefings, and each of them has done so.

b. Procedures for Applying the Court Ordered
Standard (e)

(TS//SI//NF) When a number is considered as a
candidate to be a seed with which to query the archive, one
of the designated approval authorities examines whatever
supporting documentation is included with the request with
an eye towards deciding whether, based on the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving
rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that a
particular known telephone number is associated with
[REDACTED]

(TS//SI//NF) The application of this "reasonable
person" standard is applied using a test similar to the
"totality of the circumstances" test used by the courts.
The decision as to whether a particular telephone number
qualifies as a seed in connection with the Order is
informed by a variety of factors that could give rise to a
reasonable articulable suspicion. Some of the factors
militating in favor of using a particular telephone number
as a seed include (but are not limited to):

  • telephonic contact between the phone number in
    question and that of a person reasonably believed

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to be a member or agent of [REDACTED]

  • other direct contact, as revealed through other
    SIGINT, HUMINT, or other intelligence
    information, in which a telephone number is
    conveyed when that contact involves a person
    reasonably believed to be a member or agent of
    [REDACTED]
  • open source information that indicates a
    telephone number is used by a person who is
    reasonably believed to be a member or agent of
    [REDACTED]

c. Application of the Standard to Determine Whether
a Telephone Number Qualifies as a Seed Number
Under the Court's Order (TS//SI//NF)

  1. Queries Made as a Result of Automated
    Alerts (e)

(TS//SI//NF) NSA has compiled through its continuous
counter-terrorism analysis, a list of telephone numbers
that constitute an "alert list" of telephone numbers used
by members of [REDACTED] This alert list serves as a body of
telephone numbers employed to query the data, as is
described more fully below.

(TS//SI//NF) Domestic numbers and foreign numbers are
treated differently with respect to the criteria for
including them on the alert list. With respect to foreign
telephone numbers, NSA receives information indicating a
tie to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] from a variety of sources. Principal among
these are: reporting by the FBI, CIA or NSA; open source
information tying a telephone number to a member of
[REDACTED] known to the Intelligence Community; information from a
foreign intelligence service known by the U.S. Intelligence
Community to be reliable; and telephony contact between the
telephone of a known [REDACTED] and another telephone.
Each of the foreign telephone numbers that comes to the
attention of NSA as possibly related to [REDACTED]
is evaluated to
determine whether the information about it provided to NSA
satisfies the reasonable articulable suspicion standard.
If so, the foreign telephone number is placed on the alert
list; if not, it is not placed on the alert list.

(TS//SI//NF) The process set out above applies also to
newly discovered domestic telephone numbers considered for
addition to the alert list, with the additional requirement
that NSA's Office of General Counsel reviews these numbers
and affirms that the telephone number is not the focus of
the analysis based solely on activities that are protected
by the First Amendment. There are, however, two categories
of domestic telephone numbers that were added to the NSA
alert list prior to the date the Order took effect, and the
basis for their addition is slightly different.

(TS//SI//NF) The first category consists of 177
domestic numbers that are currently the subject of FISC
authorized electronic surveillance based on the FISC'S
finding of probable cause to believe that they are used by
[REDACTED] Since these numbers were already reviewed
and authorized by the Court for electronic surveillance

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purposes, they were deemed approved for meta data querying
without the approval of an NSA official.

(TS//SI//NF) The second category consists of 199
domestic numbers each of which was added to the NSA alert
list after coming to NSA's attention because of its direct
contact with a known foreign [REDACTED] seed number, and
subsequent NSA analysis produced a sufficient level of
suspicion that NSA generated an intelligence report about
the telephone number to the FBI and the CIA. NSA'S OGC has
not reviewed the domestic numbers on the alert list that
predate the effective date of the Order, as there was no
requirement to do so with respect to NSA's activities prior
to the effective date of the Order. However, it is
important to note that these numbers are not used as seeds.
Rather, with respect to this category of telephone numbers,
in the event of a new contact, the foreign [REDACTED]
telephone number that originally sparked NSA's interest in
the domestic number would be the seed. Accordingly when
conducting contact chaining as a result of an alert list
"hit", NSA limits the number of hops it undertakes from the
domestic number to two.6

6 (TS//SI//NF) Note that NSA could if it chose to conduct queries
against the original foreign seed number every day or even multiple
times a day, so long as it continued to have a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the foreign number was associated with [REDACTED] If NSA
did so, every day NSA would see the contact between the foreign seed
and the domestic number that is on the alert list, as well as all new
foreign and domestic contacts. The inclusion of these domestic numbers
on the alert list is merely a quicker and more efficient way of
achieving the same result without looking at all the domestic to
domestic contacts that would be revealed if this were done. Stated
another way, the system is designed to bring to the attention of NSA
the fact that a telephone number about which NSA has suspicion has had
a new contact with a number overseas, but all of this is premised on
the existence of a foreign seed number that originally surfaced the
domestic number in question. Each seed number NSA uses, whether
derived from information that was on the alert list prior to the
effective date of the Order or after, meets the standard set out in the
Order.

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(TS//SI//NF) However, in order to avoid any appearance
of circumventing the procedures, NSA will change its
software to build the chains from the original foreign
number and remove the 199 domestic numbers described above
from the alert list. While the software is being
developed, which will take approximately 45 days, NSA will
continue to run the domestic numbers on the alert list as
described.

(TS//SI//NF) As of the last day of the reporting
period addressed herein, NSA had included a total of 3980
telephone numbers on the alert list, which includes foreign
numbers and domestic numbers, after concluding that each of
the foreign telephone numbers satisfied the standard set
forth in the Court's May 24, 2006, and each of the domestic
telephone numbers was either a FISC approved number or in
direct contact with a foreign seed that met those criteria.

(TS//SI//NF) To summarize the alert system: every
day new contacts are automatically revealed with the 3980
telephone numbers contained on the alert list described
above, which themselves are present on the alert list
either because they satisfied the reasonable articulable
suspicion standard, or because they are domestic numbers
that were either a FISC approved number or in direct
contact with a number that did so. These automated queries
identify any new telephone contacts between the numbers on
the alert list and any other number, except that domestic
numbers do not alert on domestic-to-domestic contacts.

(TS//SI//NF) During this reporting period, a
combination of the alert system and queries resulting from
leads described below in paragraph two led to analysis that
resulted in the discovery of 138 new numbers that were

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tipped as leads to the FBI and the CIA as suspicious
telephone numbers.

  1. Queries Resulting From Leads Other Than the
    Automated Alert System (e)

(TS//SI//NF) The other type of query that NSA
analysts run are those based upon seed telephone numbers of
which NSA became aware through means other than the
automated alerting system. These are telephone numbers
that NSA has learned about through other sources, such as
communications it intercepted through other authorized
surveillance activities or information provided to NSA by
other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. A Shift
Coordinator approves all proposed queries of the archived
data prior to their taking place, applying the standard set
out in the Court's Order. If the Shift Coordinator
determines an address is known or believed to be used by a
U.S. person, the query is sent to the NSA OGC. Otherwise,
the Shift Coordinator authorized (or disallowed) the use of
the address as a seed address based on the criteria
contained in the Court's Order.7

(TS//SI//NF) During this reporting period, in response
to lead information primarily from CIA, FBI and internal to
NSA, NSA determined that 153 new telephone numbers
satisfied the reasonable articulable suspicion and
designated them as seeds; NSA then conducted analyses of

7 (TS//SI//NF) Analysts are well-versed in the rules governing queries
of the data obtained as a result of the Court's Order. Informal
discussion among the counter-terrorism analysts frequently precedes the
submission of a formal request for authorization to conduct contact
chaining [REDACTED] Accordingly, a subset of the
potential seed numbers is discussed among the analysts and rejected as
candidates at the analyst level. In these cases, no formal request to
use the number as a seed number is ever made.

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the acquired data as described in the Court's Order. Also
during this reporting period, NSA declined to process 46
telephone numbers it had received primarily from CIA, FBI
and internal to NSA, concluding the standard had not been
satisfied. Of the 199 numbers proposed, 108 numbers were
submitted to the NSA OGC because they were believed to be
used by U.S. persons. NSA'S OGC approved 99 as seeds, and
declined to approve 9.

c. Example of Application of the Standard and
Resulting Report (e)

(TS//SI//NF) Analysis of information obtained pursuant
to the Court's authorization in the above-captioned matter
resulted in querying the archived data using a known
telephone number that satisfied the standard set out in the
Court's Order, and a subsequent report identifying multiple
foreign and two US-based possible terrorist-related leads.
This new information was a direct result of meta data
analysis of telephone numbers used by [REDACTED]

(TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] from intelligence
information gathered in the area, immediately after the
raid. An NSA Shift Coordinator determined that, based on
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there existed
facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion

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that this phone number was associated with [REDACTED] The
Shift Coordinator approved querying the archived data using
this number as a seed, and NSA learned from several SIGINT
sources that prior to [REDACTED] his [REDACTED]
number had been in contact with multiple [REDACTED]
which were subsequently in contact, [REDACTED]
with numbers
in the United States, Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom. NSA reported these foreign and domestic
[REDACTED] contacts
obtained through analysis of data authorized by this Court
through BR-06-05 to FBI, CIA, and the NCTC.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE WAY CALL DETAIL RECORDS WILL BE
RECEIVED BY NSA (TS//SI//NF)

(TS//SI//NF) NSA anticipates that, if the Order is
renewed, it will [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
18


TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR

[REDACTED] Aside from this, NSA anticipates no changes and
proposes no changes to the way it receives the call detail
records.

17 August 2006
Date

(Signature, name)
SID Program Manager for [REDACTED] Projects
National Security Agency

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//MR
19