SID Mailbag: Need-to-Share vs Need-to-Know

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2005-11-29
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
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Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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The NSA is trying to share more information within the intelligence community as recommended in the 9/11 Commission report. There are several factors that hamper information-sharing, including minimization rules, lack of bandwidth to transfer data, and training other agencies to understand signals intelligence.

Long Description:
This SIDtoday Mailbag article addresses the tension between need-to-share and need-to-know in response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation for greater information sharing across the Intelligence Community. It explains how SID transformed Management Directive 406 into USSID CR1610 and adopted NSA/CSS Policy 1-9 to clarify what SIGINT can be shared and with whom, while noting that Executive Order 12333 and NSCID 6 still require oversight of raw SIGINT. It describes pilot efforts, such as granting DIA counterterrorism analysts access to databases, and the challenges of bandwidth, hardware, and training encountered in sharing data.
Programs:
WEBWORLD

People mentioned:
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Countries:
-

Tags:
information sharing, need-to-know, need-to-share, minimization, data access, counterterrorism, policy

Identifier:
2005-11-29_SIDToday_-_SID_Mailbag_Need-to-Share_vs_Need-to-Know

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SIDtoday

(U) SID Mailbag: Need-to-Share vs Need-to-Know

FROM: SIGINT Communications
Unknown
Run Date: 11/29/2005

Question : (U) The 9-11 commission recommended that the intelligence community transform
from a need-to-know mentality to one of need-to-share.

(U//FOUO) How does SID view the recommendation, specifically with regard to information held
only within the SIGINT production chain? Will SID directive 406 be rewritten to reflect a sharing
responsibility?

Answer:

(U//FOUO) Events of the last several years have clearly demonstrated that the Intelligence
Community (IC), and, in fact, the federal government, must do a much better job of sharing
information. We talk now more about the need-to-share and are taking great efforts to ensure
we share as much information as possible. That said, if we do not want to risk losing intelligence
sources, we must still be certain to protect those sources and the methods by which we collect
intelligence. Therefore, the need-to-know concept remains alive and well-- but we understand it
now more as a need-to-know in a need-to-share environment.

(U//FOUO) The need-to-share change must happen not only outside the SIGINT production
chain, but also within it. We have already transformed SID Management Directive 406 into
USSID CR1610 with a specific annex titled "Raw SIGINT Database Access Procedures for
Extended Enterprise SIGINT Production Personnel." This document is an effort to simplify
getting database accesses within the SIGINT Production Chain, something that has been a
challenge at times. Because Executive Order (EO) 12333 and National Security Council
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 6 have not been substantially changed since 9/11, we are still
bound by those foundational documents to ensure oversight of unminimized and unevaluated or
"raw" SIGINT (as defined in USSID CR1610). This means that we must continue to control
access to that data. We are in fact granting more and more IC partners access to the data by
placing them under SIGINT authorities or integrating more NSA SIGINTers into our partners'
operations to serve those partners in a more timely and targeted way. But we are still bound by
the oversight requirements and cannot grant wholesale access.

(U//FOUO) We also now have NSA/CSS Policy 1-9 on Information Sharing that implements IC
and other executive branch directives on information sharing and clarifies what SIGINT (and
Information Assurance) information may be shared and with whom. That policy is available
here. The SIGINT Policy office, together with other SID elements, is currently working to
develop more detailed implementation guidelines for metadata sharing so that SID analysts will
better understand exactly what can be shared with whom.

(C) We have also tried some efforts to grant SIGINT authorities to larger sets of partners, such
as the Joint Task Force-CT, where we worked with more than 30 DIA Counterterrorism (CT)
analysts to get them access to a set of CT-related databases. We had to work through a number
of problems in this effort -- one was the amount of bandwidth needed to access and pull the
data and other problems were related to hardware/server issues. Another problem involved the
training needed to understand the data in our databases and how to work with it and verify it.

(U//FOUO) The various pilot efforts we have undertaken with selected partners have underlined
the very real value of collaborating with those partners on the data we share with them.
Consequently, in the interest of improving SIGINT analysis, analysts are encouraged to share
with our partners previously unpublished SIGINT information that has been minimized and
evaluated for foreign intelligence. USSID CR 1611(P) provides details of those procedures and
responsibilities. (See related article "Pre-Pub Sharing of SIGINT: An Everyday Event .)

(U//FOUO) Because data access is not only a policy matter, we have also been working with the
SIGINT Contact Center to devise an expedited process, especially for tactical SIGINTers, to allow
access to needed databases. We are working with ITD to facilitate approval for NSA WEBWORLD
access across the IC.

(U//FOUO) Please direct further questions on this topic to [REDACTED] S02L1,
SIGINT Policy.

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."

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