From the SID Mailbag: When To Mark Things 'COMINT'

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2005-09-09
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL

The COMINT (Communications Intelligence) classification marking, along with Special Intelligence, often refers to information derived from foreign communications. However, the marking can also be used for “SIGINT equities that support the production of Communications Intelligence.” For example, secret information-sharing arrangements with foreign governments are classified SI, because these relationships lead to the acquisition of foreign communications.

Long Description:
This SIDtoday 'From the SID Mailbag' column answers a reader's question about when to apply the COMINT/SI classification caveat. It explains that while COMINT is formally defined as intelligence derived from foreign communications, the SI marking is used more broadly to protect SIGINT equities such as methods and partnerships. Using DIRgram examples referencing the Athens Olympics and NSA's relationship with Italy, it clarifies that SCS locations and Third Party cryptologic relationships are protected at S//SI or TS//SI levels per the SISR.
Programs:
ITIS

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Greece, Italy

Tags:
comint, classification, special intelligence, third party relationships, Special Collection Service, policy, partnership

Identifier:
2005-09-09_SIDToday_-_From_the_SID_Mailbag_When_To_Mark_Things_COMINT

PDF SHA-256:
650c9e10229b5afa8d84cc21b862f34e28bf3e244fd57c073d7d1c9437071e61

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SIDtoday

(U) From the SID Mailbag: When To Mark Things 'COMINT'

FROM: SIGINT Communications
Unknown
Run Date: 09/09/2005

Question:

(U//FOUO) I've been working here a few years, but I'm still confused about when to use the
"COMINT" caveat when classifying things. Just about everything I read around here seems to
have the COMINT label, though many times I don't see a connection. According to the NSA/CSS
Classification Manual dated 23 Nov 04, COMINT is defined as:

"(U) Communications Intelligence (COMINT) - Technical and intelligence information derived
from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients."

(U) However, take, for example, some exerpts from past DIRgrams (which I assume are
properly classified):

"(TS//SI//REL) The closing ceremonies at the Summer Olympics marked the end of a period of
extensive NSA engagement that began almost as soon as Athens was selected as the venue. By
all accounts, Team NSA earned a gold medal! SID, SCS, IAD, FAD, and ITIS worked hard to
leverage existing partnerships and strengthen others, resulting in a safe, secure games." (from
[REDACTED])

"(S//SI//REL) I have decided to elevate our representation in Rome to an NSA senior-level
(DISES) position. This change will send a clear signal to the U.S. and Italian intelligence
communities about the importance we attach to our growing cryptologic relationship with our
counterparts in Italy. It will better enable NSA to respond to customer and NSA HQ
requirements, and will enhance NSA's third-party relationship with the Italian Intelligence and
Military Security Service (SISMI) and the Italian Military's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)." (from
[REDACTED])

(U//FOUO) In these cases, nothing seems to be derived from foreign communication. So it
seems like there is more to the definition of COMINT than I know about. Any further details
would be greatly appreciated!

Answer:

(U//FOUO) As you've correctly researched, the "SI" marking in portion-marking, and the overall
classification marking of "COMINT" are used widely to cover a variety of SIGINT equities that
support the production of Communications Intelligence (COMINT), and are not strictly
reserved for the foreign communications that result from those efforts. Section 2 of the
Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR) document provides the general categories and
levels of information that require TS//SI or S//SI protection.

(TS//SI) In the examples you cite, both are classified with "SI" to protect SIGINT methods and
partnerships, consistent with the guidance in the SISR. The first is classified with "SI" due to the
implication that we have an SCS location in Athens. All of our SCS locations are protected with
"SI" to safeguard our SIGINT activities from the hosting nation. If discovered, we could lose
these vital access points. The second is classified with "SI" because it reveals the fact of our
cryptologic partnership with Italy, constituting another sensitive SIGINT asset that we want to
protect. The mere fact of each of our Third Party relationships is protected at a minimum of
S//SI, while the most sensitive and secret are TS//SI, as you'll see in the SISR.

(U) We hope that the SISR will serve as a good resource for other uses of SI that you encounter.
If you would like to attain greater expertise in this area, you are also encouraged to take
advantage of the classification courses offered by NCS, at varied levels to meet your needs.

Please visit the course guide for more information on classification courses.

(U//FOUO)
[REDACTED]
D/Chief S02L
SIGINT Policy, Congressional and Intelligence Security Issues,
[REDACTED]

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."

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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108