Tag: third party relationships 8 documents
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Third Party Relationships SIDtoday [pdf]
A 2009 NSA SIDtoday interview with a Foreign Affairs Directorate official explaining the strategic rationale behind NSA's third-party intelligence partnerships — revealing that these relationships are deliberately insulated from democratic oversight because most elected officials in partner countries are kept entirely unaware of their governments' SIGINT cooperation with the NSA.
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Back in Time: A Look at the US-ROK SIGINT Relationship SIDtoday [pdf]
A brief history of the unique wartime signals intelligence relationship between the U.S. and South Korea, including the founding of South Korea's own SIGINT agency and the United States Special Liaison Adviser Korea that continues today.
People: Cho, Yong IlThe Intercept ↗ (2017-09-13) -
Conducting SIGINT Relationships Beneath the Political Waterline SIDtoday [pdf]
The US operated a "large SIGINT facility" in Thailand during the Vietnam war in 1975, but in 1976, after a Thai coup, the government forced the US to close its facility. Still, the new Thai government chose to expand its third party relationship with NSA, "with the Thai side desiring to keep its newly expanded role out of the political limelight."
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
Czech Mates? SIDtoday [pdf]
Six members of an NSA delegation visit the Czech Republic's External Intelligence Service to gather information for a decision on a possible Third Party relationship. "Their SIGINT professionals display overall levels of sophistication, knowledge, practical experience, ingenuity, and enthusiasm that allow them to overcome many financial and equipment shortfalls," the author writes.
The Intercept ↗ (2017-09-13) -
Driver 1: Worldwide SIGINT/Defense Cryptologic Platform [pdf]
A 2012 NSA management presentation slide revealing the agency's global surveillance architecture across five categories of access — covert cable taps, regional collection sites, computer network exploitation implants, foreign satellite collection, and third-party liaison relationships — including a list of cities hosting clandestine collection operations and confirmation of over 50,000 worldwide malware implants.
Programs: STELLAR · SOUNDER · SNICK · MOONPENNY · LADYLOVE · INDRA · IRONSAND · JACKKNIFE · CARBOY · TIMBERLINE“NSA infected 50,000 computer networks with malicious software” - NRC ↗ (2013-11-23) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Boon, Floor · Derix, Steven · Modderkolk, Huib · Greenwald, Glenn -
From the SID Mailbag: When To Mark Things 'COMINT' SIDtoday [pdf]
The COMINT (Communications Intelligence) classification marking, along with Special Intelligence, often refers to information derived from foreign communications. However, the marking can also be used for “SIGINT equities that support the production of Communications Intelligence.” For example, secret information-sharing arrangements with foreign governments are classified SI, because these relationships lead to the acquisition of foreign communications.
Programs: ITISThe Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
Jordanians Provide Arabic OJT SIDtoday [pdf]
Four NSA language analysts are in Jordan to receive on-the-job Arabic language training from analysts at the Jordanian Electronic Warfare Directorate.
The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
NSA Intelligence Relationship with Saudi Arabia [pdf]
A 2013 NSA information paper outlining the agency's expanding surveillance partnership with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, providing the Saudis with advanced signals intelligence technology, decryption services, and targeting support — including capabilities used to track individuals inside the kingdom.