SIGINT Helping HUMINT
Open PDFDocument date: 2005-06-13
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 1
Genre: newsletter
Banner: DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: -
The authors tell two stories about the NSA supporting the CIA and FBI. In 2004, the NSA shared intercepted conversations between "a high-priority HUMINT (human intelligence) target and his close family relatives" with the CIA, which was conducting a "major operation" related to Iran's weapons of mass destruction program. And in 2005, the NSA helped Russian linguists from the FBI analyze intercepted communications from a Russian communications system, helping to "rule out some suspected communicators."
My notes
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
(U//FOUO) SIGINT Helping HUMINT
FROM: [REDACTED] HUMINT Support / Support to Operations Branch
(S2D31) and
[REDACTED], Deputy Chief, CIHS's Central Eurasia Division (S2D1)
Run Date: 06/13/2005
(TS//SI) In the wake of 9/11, SID has shared more SIGINT-related information with Intelligence
Community partners than ever before -- more, in fact, than some ever thought possible. This
has been especially true regarding SIGINT support to HUMINT operations. Here's a case in point:
In late 2004, the CIA was conducting a major operation against individuals connected to Iran's
covert weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The SID shop that supports HUMINT
operations, S2D31, broke new ground in sharing information with CIA, with important results.
(TS//SI) NSA possessed audio files and verbatim transcripts of intercepted conversations
between a high-priority HUMINT target and his close family relatives. The material was not only
analyzed and reported, but also transmitted in raw form with accompanying analytic comments
to CIA with the help of the Special Source Operations' Global Operations Management Division
(S3323) and under the guidance of S1's SIGINT Post-Publication Services (S1213). This specially
tailored product enabled CIA operatives to positively identify speakers, more effectively assess
the mental state of its human assets (i.e. people providing CIA with information) and sub-assets,
and advise these assets under conditions which, at times, were truly life-threatening.
(S//SI) In another information-sharing endeavor, five Russian linguists from the FBI visited
CIHS (Counter Intelligence and HUMINT Support - S2D) in February 2005 to listen to intercept
of [REDACTED] a Russian [REDACTED] communications system [REDACTED].
Having already identified some personnel [REDACTED] the FBI
linguists hoped to be able to identify the voices [REDACTED] heard on this channel.
Although the linguists were unable to confirm the identities [REDACTED], they were
able to use what they heard to rule out some suspected communicators. Additionally, they were
able to confirm some of their observations about the [REDACTED].
(U//FOUO) These two examples show how invaluable access to SIGINT -- once rarely shared
outside SIGINT channels -- can be for agencies like the CIA and FBI. The S2 operations staff has
recently streamlined and simplified the process for sharing information with external IC partners.
Type "go infoshare" in your internal browser for more details.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108