Country: Tunisia 11 documents
Search documents matching “Tunisia” →Countries mentioned in each document. A country may be mentioned directly (e.g., France) or inferred from a related reference, such as a city (Paris -> France) or a domain name (.fr -> France).
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Approved SIGINT Partners [pdf]
A Foreign Affairs Directorate slide listing NSA's approved SIGINT partners: the four Second Parties, 33 Third Parties from Algeria to the United Arab Emirates, and the coalitions AFSC, NATO, SSEUR and SSPAC. This is document is from Fiscal Year 2013 "Foreign Partner Review."
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Belgacom connections [pdf]
A "Belgacom connections" map lays out the carrier’s sprawling roaming and backbone interconnects, precisely the arteries GCHQ wanted to get access into. Under Operation Socialist GCHQ successfully gained access to Belgacom’s infrastructure, including internal employee computers and encrypted and unencrypted streams of private communications handled by the company.
Programs: CARBONROD“Operation Socialist: The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Lees hier hoe de Britse geheime dienst GCHQ Belgacom aanviel” - NRC ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Britse geheime dienst bespioneerde jarenlang Belgacom-klanten” - De Standaard ↗ (2014-12-13) · Gallagher, Ryan · Modderkolk, Huib · Vanhecke, Nikolas · Eeckhaut, Mark -
Guidelines for the classification of NSA SIGINT details (1945-1967) [pdf]
This document is an NSA classification guide that defines how and why historical SIGINT material from 1945–1967 remains classified, in many cases for 75 years. It systematically explains which intelligence activities, targets, partnerships, and technical methods must stay protected because they still reveal sensitive sources, methods, and diplomatic equities.
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List of foreign governments and organizations authorized for surveillance [pdf]
This exhibit lists the 193 foreign governments as well as foreign factions, political organizations and other entities that were part of a 2010 certification approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. These are the entities about which the NSA may conduct surveillance, for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. Each year a new certification must be approved by the court to permit such surveillance under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.
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Middle East and North Africa Build-Out Status SIDtoday [pdf]
An update on the analysis and production build-out and how it affects the Middle East and North Africa mission, which began transferring from NSA Washington to NSA Georgia in 1995. The mission also has positions at GCHQ locations in the U.K. and at the European Security Center in Germany.
People: Coyner, Mary JoThe Intercept ↗ (2018-08-15) -
PRC Information Warfare & Huawei [pdf]
This NSA intelligence briefing on Huawei analyzes Huawei’s global telecommunications presence and its potential links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese government intelligence activities. It highlights concerns that Huawei’s international market expansion — including its subcontracted 2008 upgrade of the TAT-14 transatlantic cable carrying U.S. and defense communications — could be exploited by China for signals intelligence (SIGINT) purposes.
People: Chávez, Hugo -
Renewed Interest in the Tunisian Partnership SIDtoday [pdf]
NSA staffers traveled to Tunisia to discuss joint satellite communications collection and cooperation in counterterrorism efforts aimed at the terrorist group Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. Tunisia has unique access to signals intelligence relating to that target along the Libyan and Algerian borders.
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
Report on an XKeyscore training session at the ECC / Dagger Complex [pdf]
This 2012 report details a highly successful XKEYSCORE (XKS) "Circuit Training" event at the European Cryptologic Center (ECC) in Germany, which dramatically increased analyst usage of the powerful SIGINT tool. The training, which used a "speed dating" format and gamification, helped analysts overcome their intimidation and led to significant intelligence discoveries.
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SSO news relevant entries [pdf]
This document provides updates on multiple operational advancements within the FAIRVIEW program under Special Source Operations (SSO).
Programs: SSO · FAIRVIEW · OVERHILL · EVILOLIVE · TURMOIL · FREEWAY · LEGIONJADE · NASSAUSHORE · PINECONE · ETML · VANGUARD · NETFLOW · FRIAR · MAINWAY · CLIFFSIDE · TWISTEDPATH · E-TML · COURIERSKILL · UTT · CADENCE · PINWALEPeople: Wertheimer, Michael“NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-06-25) · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Gallagher, Ryan -
The European Security Center to Become the 'ESOC' SIDtoday [pdf]
The European Security Center in Darmstadt, Germany will expand to become the European Security Operations Center; additional civilian NSA staff will join existing Army staff. The ESOC's primary responsibilities will be targets in Africa.
“The NSA in Germany: Snowden's Documents Available for Download” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-06-18) · The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
ZAIN INTRANET NETWORK ENGINEERING [pdf]
2009 GCHQ report documents the sampling and tasking of a satellite data carrier linking Gabon and Belgium that carried the internal corporate intranet of telecom operator Zain (formerly MTC Vodafone), through which engineers exchanged technical data via SMTP email. The intercept surfaced email selectors belonging to staff across multiple telecom operators — including Zain subsidiaries, Orange Mali, Saudi Telecom, MTC Touch (Lebanon), Tunisie Telecom, and Celtel entities in Niger and Nigeria — reflecting the agency’s systematic targeting of telecom employees as a potential entry point into operators’ internal networks.