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O Globo 2013-07-07
'Brasil é um grande alvo', diz jornalista sobre vigilância dos EUA article ↗
O Globo showed some of the slides in their Fantástico TV broadcast, it didn't publish any files as PDF or images, these are screengrabs from the TV broadcast. On page 10, the mail.ru server IP is fully visible, which Der Spiegel redacted.

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NETWORK EXPLOITATION

PROFILING SSL AND ATTRIBUTING PRIVATE NETWORKS

An introduction to FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY

ICTR - Network Exploitation
GCHQ

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TR

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

GCHQ


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Motivations for FLYING P

  • More and more services used by GCHQ targets are moving to TLS/SSL to increase user confidence, e.g. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmai
  • Terrorists and cyber criminals are common users of TLS/SSL to hide their comms (not necessarily using the big providers).

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Query by certificate metadata

FLYING PIG

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Query by certificate metadata

FLYING PIG

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

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Query by server IP

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

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Query by server IP

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

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Query by client IP

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

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Query by ne

YING PIG
SL KNOWLEDGE BASE

cation | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD

LYING PIG
ork/certificate field: [REDACTED].0/24

  Client IP Server IP Both
  or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
  or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]

Network-specific panels:
General network info
SSL Clients present in network
SSL Servers present in network
HTTP requests to IPs in network

ery!

e field search: %mail.ru
Server IP: 94.100.184.14
Client IP: [REDACTED].127
Network:

etwork info for: [REDACTED].0/24
ion (?):
R (M)
UL (L)
WHOIS info (?):
Network: No results. Network type: No results.
Company: No results. Domain: No results.
AS info
Advertis
AS name

s in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?):
iht click on a client IP to explore it further!
57 items    10 | 25 | 50 | 100

Client company info (from GEOFUSION export)  First se
2011-0

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Cyber app

iginotar certificate authority compromise :

  • Private keys of legitimate certificate authority, Diginotar, stolen by hacker
  • FLYING PIG was used to identify a FI to launch a MITM against

How the attack was done:

                           ┌───────────────────┐                         
                           │                   │                         
                           │ Legitimate Google │◄────────────────┐       
                           │       server      │                 │       
                           │                   │                 │       
                           └────────▲──────────┘                 │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                        ┌───┴───┐   
                                    │                        │       │   
                             Non-target traffic              │ MITM  │   
                                    │                        │       │   
                                    │                        └───▲───┘   
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
                                    │                            │       
─────Google request────────────►┌───┴────┐                       │       
                                │        │                       │       
─────Google request────────────►│ Router ├─────────────────Target traffic
                                │        │                               
─────Google request────────────►└───▲────┘                               
                                    │                                    
                                    │                                    
                                    │                                    
                               [REDACTED].242                            
                Logs into router and adds static route for target traffic
                                    │                                    
                                    │                                    
                                    │                                    

ation using SSL have been fou
EGION JADE, LEGION RUBY,
n FLYING PIG using known sig


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Results – what do we find?

  • Foreign government networks
  • Airlines
  • Energy companies
  • Financial organisations
  • In cases of good collection, 50-80% of collected private network traffic has been attributed
  • Some false positives can arise if few events correlated, due to factors such as TDIs not being completely unique and public internet proxies giving misleading public IP results
  • Results can frequently be verified using Kerberos etc data

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