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Der Spiegel 2014-12-28
Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security article ↗

TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

BULLRUN CoI - Briefing Sheet

Introduction

  1. The ability to exploit targets' encrypted communications is extremely fragile and is
    often enabled through sensitive ECI programmes. The need to take additional
    measures to protect that capability has long been recognised. Currently, virtually
    all decryption is carried out by PTD ([REDACTED]) processing with decrypts going to
    the IIB in the NOCON CoI; some decrypts are placed in the ENDUE CoI due to
    the sensitivity or fragility of the exploitation capability.
  1. In recent years there has been an aggressive effort, lead by NSA, to make major
    improvements in defeating network security and privacy involving multiple
    sources and methods, all of which are extremely sensitive and fragile. These
    include: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE); collaboration with other
    Intelligence Agencies; investment in high-performance computers; and
    development of advanced mathematical techniques. Several ECI compartments
    may apply to the specific sources, methods, and techniques involved.
  1. Making the best use of these new capabilities requires that decryption processing
    be widely deployed beyond PTD and the results of that processing be available to
    a wide range of analysts. This inevitably makes it harder to protect this sensitive
    and fragile capability and we need to counterbalance this by introducing
    measures to control access to this material and heighten awareness of the
    sensitivities amongst those who have access.
  1. To achieve this, NSA has introduced the BULLRUN CoI to protect our abilities to
    defeat the encryption used in network communication technologies. This covers
    both the "fact of" a capability against a specific technology and resulting decrypts
    (which may be either plaintext or metadata (events). GCHQ is also introducing
    BULLRUN. (CSEC, DSD and GCSB are expected to do likewise.)

Control Authority

  1. The BULLRUN CoI is owned by the Deputy Director for Penetrating Target
    Defences (PTD). Authority to manage the CoI is delegated to the PTD Lead for
    Special Operations and Policy (currently [REDACTED]) and the PTD Security
    and Release Authority (OPC-SEC, currently [REDACTED]).

BULLRUN Sensitivity and Coverage

  1. It is imperative to protect the fact that GCHQ, NSA and their Sigint partners have
    capabilities against specific network security technologies as well as the number
    and scope of successes. These capabilities are among the Sigint community's
    most fragile, and the inadvertent disclosure of the simple "fact of" could alert the
    adversary and result in immediate loss of the capability. Consequently, any
    admission of "fact of" a capability to defeat encryption used in specific network
    communication technologies or disclosure of details relating to that capability
    must be protected by the BULLRUN COI and restricted to those specifically

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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

indoctrinated for BULLRUN. The various types of security covered by BULLRUN
include, but are not limited to, TLS/SSL, https (e.g. webmail), SSH, encrypted
chat, VPNs and encrypted VOIP. The specific instances of these technologies
that can be exploited will be published in a separate Annexe (available to
BULLRUN indoctrinated staff).

  1. In addition to the specific technologies that GCHQ or its Sigint partners are able
    to exploit, the methods used to achieve the exploitation must also be protected.
    These include support from other organisations, both internal and external to
    GCHQ. Access to BULLRUN does NOT imply any "need-to-know" the details of
    sources and methods used to achieve exploitation and, in general, there will be
    NO "need-to-know". Requests for access to information on sources and methods
    should be sent to OPC-SEC; if considered appropriate, this access may require
    clearance for certain ECIs.
  1. BULLRUN material, data, and details must be protected with the use of the
    BULLRUN CoI and be marked with the label "BULLRUN," in addition to the
    required privacy marking and other descriptors. Use of the BULLRUN marking
    is restricted to GCHQ and its Sigint 2nd Parties.

Access and Security

  1. Requests for access to the CoI must be sponsored by a GC8 or above and must
    be accompanied by a business case outlining the "need-to-know". Access for
    contractors will be limited and will require a strong business case; such requests
    should be discussed with the CoI Authority's delegates before submission.
    Requests for access are to be sent by email to PTDAccesses.
  1. Knowledge of BULLRUN information and access to the BULLRUN CoI will only
    be granted to indoctrinated individuals.
  1. It is the responsibility of sponsors (or their successors) to notify OPC-SEC (via
    PTDAccesses) when an individual no longer require access to BULLRUN.

Handling Procedures

  1. Owners of BULLRUN materials are responsible for correctly marking the
    information and for ensuring that it is handled according to guidelines for
    protecting classified or COI information.
  1. Reports derived from BULLRUN material shall not reveal (or imply) that the
    source data was decrypted. The network communication technology that carried
    the communication should not be revealed.
  1. Further dissemination, other than in product reports, of any data or information
    derived from BULLRUN data must be thoroughly justified and receive prior
    approval from OPC-SEC.

2 of 4

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

  1. All questions or concerns regarding BULLRUN material and information should
    be directed to OPC-SEC.

Protective Marking Guidance

The following offers some guidance on Protective Markings (PM) for BULLRUN
material. Questions regarding PMs can be directed to the CoI Authority's delegates.

At SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :

The fact that GCHQ has unspecified capabilities against network security
technologies eg TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec. NB capability does not
necessarily equate to decryption capability.

At TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :

The fact that GCHQ or its 2nd Party partners has some capability against the
encryption used in a class or type of network communications technology. For
example, VPNs, IPSec, TSL/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, encrypted chat, encrypted VoIP.

At TOP SECRET STRAP2 COMINT BULLRUN AUSCANZUKUS EYES :

The fact that GCHQ or a 2nd Party partner has a capability against a specific
encrypted network security technology - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum,
specific capabilities may be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)

The fact that GCHQ or its partners exploits specific encrypted network
communications - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may
be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)

Decrypts (plaintext or derived events / metadata) obtained from BULLRUN
capabilities. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may be protected by additional
restriction on "Eyes" and, in a few cases, additional ECIs.)

GLOSSARY

(U) HTTPS - HTTP traffic secured inside an SSL/TLS session, indicated by the
https:// URL, commonly using TCP port 443

(U) IPSEC -- IPSec, or IP Security, is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
standard for layer 3 real-time communication security. IPSec allows two hosts (or two
gateways) to establish a secure connection, sometimes called a tunnel. All traffic is
protected at the network layer.

(U) SSH - Secure Shell. A common protocol used for secure remote computer
access

(U) SSL - Secure Sockets Layer. Commonly used to provide secure network
communication. Widely used on the internet to provide secure web browsing,
webmail, instant messaging, electronic commerce, etc.

3 of 4

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

(U) TLS - Transport Layer Security. The follow-on to SSL, SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 are
nearly identical.

(U) VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol. A general term for the using IP networks to
make voice phone calls. The application layer protocol can be standards-based (e.g.,
H.323, SIP), or proprietary (e.g., Skype).

(U) VPN - Virtual Private Network. A private network that makes use of the public
telecommunications infrastructure, maintaining privacy via the use of a tunneling
protocol and security procedures that typically include encryption. Common protocols
include IPSEC and PPTP.

4 of 4

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT