FISC Order BR 09-01
Open PDFDocument date: 2009-03-05
Type: FOIA
Pages: 11
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: NOFORN
Order of the FISC approving the Government. ACLU/EFF FOIA Litigation.
My notes
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UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IN RE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING THE PRODUCTION
OF TANGIBLE THINGS FROM [REDACTED]
(TS)
Docket Number: BR 09-01
PRIMARY ORDER
A verified application having been made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for an order pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
amended, (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §1861, requiring the production to the National Security Agency
(NSA) of the tangible things described below, and full consideration having been given to the
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matters set forth therein, as well as the government's filings in Docket Number BR 08-13 (the
prior renewal of the above-captioned matter), the Court finds as follows:
- There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to
authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI under
guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 to protect against
international terrorism, which investigations are not being conducted solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 50 U.S.C.
§1861(c)(1). - The tangible things sought could be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a
court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a
court of the United States directing the production of records or tangible things. 50 U.S.C.
§1861(c)(2)(D). - The application includes an enumeration of the minimization procedures the
government proposes to follow with regard to the tangible things sought. Such procedures are
substantively the same as the minimization procedures proposed by the government in the prior
application and approved and adopted as binding by the order of this Court in Docket Number
BR 08-13. However, for the reasons set forth in this Court's Order entered on March 2, 2009, in
Docket Number BR 08-13 ("March 2nd Order"), the Court found that the NSA has so frequently
and systemically violated such procedures that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the
overall business records regime has never functioned effectively. March 2nd Order at 11.
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Nevertheless, the Court permitted the government to continue to acquire the tangible things
sought, but ordered the government to follow additional minimization procedures identified in its
March 2nd Order, and set forth herein. Id. at 18-20.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the application of the United States to obtain the
tangible things, as described below, satisfies the requirements of the Act and, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the application is GRANTED IN PART, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:
- The Custodians of Records of [REDACTED] shall produce to the NSA, upon service of the appropriate secondary
order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this order,
unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call
detail records or "telephony metadata" created by [REDACTED] Telephony
metadata shall include comprehensive communications routing information (e.g., originating and
terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number,
International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone
calling card numbers, and the time and duration of call. Telephony metadata shall not include
the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2510(8), or the name,
address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer. - With respect to any information the FBI receives as a result of this order (information
that is passed or "tipped" to the FBI by the NSA), the FBI shall follow as minimization
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procedures the procedures set forth in The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations (September 29, 2008).
3. With respect to the information that the NSA receives as a result of this order, the NSA
shall strictly adhere to the following minimization procedures:
A. The government is hereby prohibited from accessing business record metadata
acquired pursuant to this Court's orders in the above-captioned docket and its predecessors ("BR
metadata") for any purpose except as described herein.
B. The BR metadata may be accessed for the purposes of ensuring data integrity and
developing and testing any technological measures designed to enable the NSA to comply with
the Court's orders. Access to the BR metadata for such purposes shall be limited to the NSA
Collection Managers, Data Integrity Analysts, and System Administrators described in
paragraphs 17-18 of the Declaration of [REDACTED] Chief, Special FISA Oversight and
Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence Directorate, the National Security
Agency, filed on March 4, 2009, in the above-captioned docket ("[REDACTED] Declaration").
Additional individuals directly involved in developing and testing any technological measures
designed to enable the NSA to comply with the Court's orders may be granted access, provided
such access is approved by NSA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) on a case-by-case basis.
C. The government may request through a motion, permission from the Court to use
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specific telephone identifiers¹ that satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard² to query
[REDACTED]
²The reasonable articulable suspicion standard is met when, based on the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are
facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone identifier is associated
with [REDACTED] provided, however, that any telephone identifier believed to be used by a
U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis
of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
For purposes of this order
[REDACTED]
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the BR metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence through contact chaining [REDACTED].
[REDACTED] as described in the [REDACTED] Declaration at 6-7, on a case-by-case basis. In
addition, if the government determines that immediate querying of the BR metadata through
contact chaining [REDACTED] is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to human
life, the government may query the BR metadata for such purpose. In each such case falling
under this latter category, the government shall notify the Court of the access, in writing, no later
than 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time on the next business day after such access. Any submission to the
Court under this paragraph shall, at a minimum, specify the telephone identifier for which access
is sought or was granted, provide the factual basis for the NSA's belief that the reasonable
articulable suspicion standard has been met with regard to that identifier,³ and, if the access has
[REDACTED]
³For telephone identifiers that are currently the subject of this Court's authorized
electronic surveillance, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §1805, based on this Court's finding of probable
cause to believe that they are used by [REDACTED] including those used by U.S.
persons, the government's submission need only provide the target's name, docket number, and
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already taken place, a statement of the immediate threat necessitating such access. Only the
Chief, Special FISA Oversight and Processing, Oversight and Compliance, Signals Intelligence
Directorate; the Chief or Deputy Chief, Homeland Security Analysis Center; or one of the twenty
specially-authorized Homeland Mission Coordinators in the Analysis and Production Directorate
of the Signals Intelligence Directorate shall be authorized to access the BR metadata for purposes
of implementing this sub-paragraph.
D. The Director of the NSA shall continue to maintain mandatory procedures to strictly
control access to and use of the BR metadata, in accordance with this Court's orders.
E. The NSA shall obtain the BR metadata from [REDACTED] via dedicated
secure lines, and shall store and process the BR metadata on a secure private network that the
NSA shall exclusively operate.
F. Any processing by technical personnel of the BR metadata acquired pursuant to this
order shall be conducted through the NSA's private network, which shall be accessible only via
select machines and only to cleared technical personnel, using secured encrypted
communications.
G. Access to the BR metadata shall be accomplished through a software interface that
shall limit access to this data to authorized personnel. The NSA's Office of General Counsel
(OGC) shall monitor the designation of individuals with access to the BR metadata. Access to
the metadata shall be controlled by user name and password. When the metadata is accessed, the
date of expiration of this Court's most recent authorization of electronic surveillance.
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user's login, Internet Protocol (IP) address, date and time, and retrieval request shall be
automatically logged for auditing capability. The NSA's OGC shall monitor the functioning of
this automatic logging capability. Persons authorized to access the BR metadata shall be briefed
by the NSA's OGC concerning the authorization granted by this order and the limited
circumstances in which queries to the metadata are permitted, as well as other procedures and
restrictions regarding the retrieval, storage, and dissemination of the metadata.
H. Any dissemination of U.S. person information by the NSA shall follow the standard
NSA minimization procedures found in the Attorney General-approved guidelines (USSID 18).
Before information identifying a U.S. person may be disseminated outside of the NSA, a
judgment must be made that the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand the foreign
intelligence information or to assess its importance. Prior to the dissemination of any U.S.
person identifying information, the Chief of Information Sharing Services in the Signals
Intelligence Directorate must determine that the information identifying the U.S. person is in fact
related to counterterrorism information and that it is necessary to understand the counterterrorism
information or assess its importance. A record shall be made of every such determination.
I. At least twice every ninety days, the NSA's OGC shall conduct random spot checks,
consisting of an examination of a sample of call detail records obtained, to ensure that the NSA is
receiving only data as authorized by the Court and not receiving the substantive content of
communications.
J. The BR metadata collected under this Court's orders may be kept online (that is,
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accessible for queries) for five years from the date of acquisition, at which time it shall be
destroyed.
K. The Chief, FISA Office, Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) Program Management
Office for Counterterrorism Special Projects, Analysis and Production; Chief and Deputy Chief,
Homeland Security Analysis Center; and the Homeland Mission Coordinators shall maintain
appropriate management controls (e.g., records of all tasking decisions, audit and review
procedures) for access to the metadata and shall use the Attorney General-approved guidelines
(USSID 18) to minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons.
L. Any application to renew or reinstate the authority granted herein shall include a report
describing: (i) the queries made since the end of the reporting period of the last report filed with
the Court; and (ii) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail records would be
received from the carriers.
M. The government shall implement the additional oversight mechanisms described in
paragraph 10 of its application. Application at 25-26.
N. As previously ordered on March 2, 2009, upon completion of the government's end-
to-end system engineering and process reviews, described in Memorandum of the United States
In Response to the Court's Order Dated January 28, 2009, Tab 1, Declaration of Lieutenant
General Keith B. Alexander, United States Army, Director of the NSA, filed February 17, 2009
at 21, the government shall file a report with the Court, that shall, at a minimum, include:
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(i). an affidavit by the Director of the FBI, and affidavits by any other official responsible
for national security that the government deems appropriate, describing the value of the BR
metadata to the national security of the United States and certifying that the tangible things
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) to obtain
foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and that such investigation of a U.S. person is not
conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment;
(ii). a description of the results of the NSA's end-to-end system engineering and process
reviews, including any additional instances of non-compliance identified therefrom;
(iii). a full discussion of the steps taken to remedy any additional non-compliance as well
as the incidents described herein, and an affidavit attesting that any technological remedies have
been tested and demonstrated to be successful; and
(iv). the minimization and oversight procedures the government proposes to employ
should the Court decide to authorize the government's resumption of regular access to the BR
metadata.
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This authorization to acquire the tangible things described herein regarding [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and abroad
[REDACTED] and unknown persons in the United States and
abroad [REDACTED] expires
on the 29th day of May, 2009, at 5 p.m., Eastern Time. All other provisions of the Order shall
remain in effect until otherwise ordered by the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of March, 2009.
REGGIE B. WALTON
Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence
Suryillance Court
[REDACTED] Deputy Clerk
FISC, certify that this document
is a true and correct copy of
the original. [REDACTED]
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