Trip Report: A Visit to a Nuclear Fuel Plant

Open PDF
Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2006-10-18
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL

Three NSA employees who work on SIGINT relating to nuclear proliferation went on a field trip to a Westinghouse nuclear fuel plant. There, they observed the facility's post-9/11 security measures and the kinds of supplies and equipment that "a prospective nuclear proliferant" would seek out.

Long Description:
This SIDtoday trip report describes a September 2006 visit by NSA Combating Proliferation (S2G11) analysts to Westinghouse Electric Company's nuclear fuel plant in Columbia, South Carolina. The analysts observed the facility's fuel production processes—including UF6 conversion, uranium pellet manufacturing, and fuel assembly fabrication—as well as post-9/11 security upgrades. The report catalogs equipment and materials of interest that a prospective nuclear proliferant might seek, and notes VVER-design fuel assemblies similar to those Russia supplies to Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.
Programs:
-

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Iran, Russia, Japan

Tags:
nuclear proliferation, combating proliferation, nuclear fuel, westinghouse, uranium, physical security, export control

Identifier:
2006-10-18_SIDToday_-_Trip_Report_A_Visit_to_a_Nuclear_Fuel_Plant

PDF SHA-256:
e7fbee94ec5034223067247c22c10ee588500c473439057351c109911dfd3b73

DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL

SIDtoday

(S//SI//REL) Trip Report: A Visit to a Nuclear Fuel Plant

FROM: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
Combating Proliferation (S2G11)
Run Date: 10/18/2006

(S//SI//REL) NSA analysts get to see firsthand how nuclear fuel is produced in South Carolina,
giving them greater insight into the combating proliferation issue...

(S//SI//REL) Nuclear Proliferation (S2G11) representatives [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED] visited Westinghouse Electric Company's nuclear fuel plant in Columbia, SC, on 22
September 2006. The Westinghouse facility designs, fabricates, and distributes nuclear fuel rod
assemblies worldwide.

(S//SI//REL) [REDACTED], who has worked to establish a stronger bond with key U.S. industries,
created this Department of Defense tour and arranged with Westinghouse personnel for a close
examination of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) delivery, conversion and blending of UF6 into
uranium dioxide (UO2) powder, uranium pellet manufacturing, and loading into zircaloy tubes.

(U//FOUO) The Columbia complex covers 1,156 acres and includes 550,000 square feet of
manufacturing and office space. The facility was constructed on an old farm that Westinghouse
tour guide [REDACTED] claimed he used for goat riding before beginning his 30+ years
employment. The site is subject to annual drill requirements, reviewed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, to include simulated attacks against it.

(U//FOUO) One security upgrade post-9/11 included moving the visitor processing center from
within the main facility to the outer entrance of the plant's property. In addition, significant
funding (an over 400% increase) was applied toward the security force's equipment and training
post-9/11. Fissile material security is controlled by administrative and physical controls, to
include repeated inventories via bar coding, geometry constraints, radiation monitoring, and
personnel checklists/signoffs.

(U//FOUO) Westinghouse claims to supply over 50 percent of the world's power plants. The
facility is operating at its highest capacity in its 35+ years of operation and plant personnel are
curious regarding possible changes occurring after the $5 billion purchase of the plant (by the
Japanese) is finalized. The UF6 conversion (chemical area) is operating 3 shifts/day with five
independent lines in operation.

(S//SI//REL) The travelers observed that the overall site perimeter is surrounded by chain-link
fence that's routinely patrolled by a dedicated security force. Site structures consist of exterior
support buildings, including low-level radwaste storage, processing water holdup tanks, chemical
storage tanks, as well as warehouses for shipping containers. The interior buildings primarily
include office/admin area, sampling laboratories, and the manufacturing floor. The
manufacturing floor space is divided into 2 areas (chemical and mechanical):

  • the Chemical Area is used to convert enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel pellets via the Ammonium Diuranate (ADU) process.
  • The Mechanical Area is used to load pellets into zirconium alloy tubes/cladding, end plugs are welded onto tubes top/bottom, checked for weld integrity; grid assemblies are fabricated from zirconium alloy and inconel and subsequently used to build the nuclear fuel assembly "skeleton"; the fuel rods are loaded into the "skeleton" assembly which undergoes cleaning and final inspection.

Completed fuel assemblies awaiting shipment are stored in an enclosed compound within the
Mechanical Area's envelope and adjacent to the shipping area. Of particular interest to the Iran
watchers was the VVER-design fuel assemblies sold to a Czech reactor which is of the same
design as the assemblies being supplied by Russia to Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

(SI) As CP analysts, the group noted the following equipment and material that could be used by
a prospective nuclear proliferant:

  1. UF6 cylinder handling, operations, and storage - (e.g. "vaporizers" used to heat up UF6
    cylinders which took ~4 hours);
  1. uranium recovery processes, including chemicals used (perchlorate, Tri-Butyl Phosphate
    (TBP), nitric acid, and kerosene);
  1. differences between blending UF6 powder (solid phase)(for fuel pellet production) versus
    enriching uranium (UF6 gaseous phase);
  1. the impact on manufacturing that a loss of offsite power would entail, including
    equipment re-start issues/challenges;
  1. hazardous gases on-site (anhydrous ammonia, UF6 gas);
  1. molybdenum "boats" used in sintering furnaces;
  1. equipment/technology controlled by Nuclear Suppliers Group export restrictions (Parts 1
    and 2), including Linear Variable Differential Transformer (LVDT) system (used for final
    fuel assembly inspection/alignment), isostatic presses (used for powder/pellet
    pressing/production), zirconium tubes, nuclear reactor control rods, automatic test and
    inspection stations especially designed and prepared for checking the integrity of
    completed fuel rods, etc;
  1. nuclear criticality controls incorporated throughout the various stages of manufacturing;
    and
  1. process activity durations (e.g. 26 -28 hrs to empty a full UF6 cylinder).

(U) Finally, as the group departed, plant security thanked DoD (NSA) personnel for helping to
defend the country.

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."

DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108