Cryptologic Language Readiness and Mandatory Language Training

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2005-09-20
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: SECRET
Dissemination: -

The NSA is falling short of its goal that all language analysts take a four-to-eight-week language training course; only 30 percent have met the requirement and only 30 percent have taken any language training. Signals Intelligence Director Richard Quirk is mandating that all individuals who have not taken these courses do so.

Long Description:
In this SIDtoday message, SIGINT Director MG Richard J. Quirk reiterates his March 2004 mandate that every civilian and military language analyst receive 4-8 weeks of language training by March 2006. He notes that only about 30% of analysts have met the Significant Cryptologic Language Training Event (SCLTE) requirement and only 50% have taken any language training, and that the language readiness index stands at 52%. Quirk directs leadership and the Senior Language Authority to identify analysts who have not met the requirement and offer training options such as platform courses, LANGNET modules, vendor training, and independent study.
Programs:
LANGNET

People mentioned:
Quirk, Richard, Meyer, Renee

Countries:
-

Tags:
language training, cryptologic language readiness, training, language analysts, mandate

Identifier:
2005-09-20_SIDToday_-_Cryptologic_Language_Readiness_and_Mandatory_Language_Training

PDF SHA-256:
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SIDtoday

(U//FOUO) Cryptologic Language Readiness and Mandatory
Language Training

FROM: MG Richard J. Quirk, USA
SIGINT Director
Run Date: 09/20/2005

(S) On 2 March 2004, I mandated that every civilian and military language analyst
in the Enterprise receive 4 - 8 weeks of language training by March 2006.* The
reasons for this mandate remain compelling: [REDACTED]

  • The NSA/CSS requirement for cryptologic language work is Level 3/3 (general professional performance level)
  • Over 25% of our missions require language skills beyond Level 3
  • Language development has a direct impact on cryptologic language readiness
  • Our capabilities Language Readiness Index is 52%, with 80% representing manageable risk

(U//FOUO) A recent snapshot of language training completed by all language analysts indicated
that approximately 30% of our language analysts have met the Significant Cryptologic
Language Training Event (SCLTE) requirement and only 50% have taken any language
training at all.

(U//FOUO) This message reiterates my commitment to improving our cryptologic language
readiness through language training and directs my leadership to ensure our language analysts
take advantage of the training opportunities offered by my mandate. I expect managers,
language advisors and technical leaders at all levels to engage actively in this critical initiative,
and I have directed the NSA/CSS Senior Language Authority, Renee Meyer, to provide me
monthly updates of our progress from now on.

(U//FOUO) With the assistance of the Associate Directorate of Education and Training and the
SCE** Command Language Program offices, Enterprise language advisors will identify those
individuals who have not met the mandatory language training requirement and will recommend
options for them. These options include:

  • traditional platform courses,
  • web-based LANGNET modules,
  • vendor training, and
  • directed and independent studies programs for those who are at Level 3 or who are unable to attend scheduled training.

(U//FOUO) Together, we must and will ensure that our cryptologic language analysts are fully
capable of protecting our country and our young men and women who have put their lives on
the line.

(U) Notes:

* See the 2 March 2004 message: (U) Cryptologic Language Readiness
** SCE = Service Cryptologic Element

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."

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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108