Lost in the Open

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2005-02-14
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dissemination: -

Sometimes NSA analysts need to make "cover" phone calls, without leaking the fact that they're being made from the NSA. In 2005, the NSA owned 40,000 telephone numbers from area codes that were publicly connected to the agency. But for situations in which an analyst needs to make a public phone call without leaking their NSA affiliation, the Special Operations Support office has some options: "Anonymous telephones" are lines that physically connect to the NSA, but they are registered to "DoD," and only "examination of vendor-billing records will disclose affiliation with a physical NSA location." "Cover telephones" are registered using alias names and P.O. boxes, and do a more thorough job at hiding NSA affiliation.

Long Description:
This 2005 SIDtoday article from Special Operational Support (S3092) explains how NSA analysts can conduct non-secure phone communications while limiting or hiding their affiliation with the agency. It notes that NSA owns 40,000 telephone numbers under well-known area-office code sets and describes two mechanisms: 'anonymity telephones,' which obscure NSA affiliation via non-NSA vendor lines and DoD billing, and 'cover telephones,' which use alias names and post office boxes for greater concealment. It also outlines International Direct Distance Dialing (IDDD) policy and offers training and support contacts.
Programs:
GROUNDBREAKER

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
-

Tags:
telephony, anonymity, covert communications, non-secure communications, tradecraft, iddd, special operational support

Identifier:
2005-02-14_SIDToday_-_Lost_in_the_Open

PDF SHA-256:
e584d5078a34bf0a443b778bd6b2fd937b2e8d6fc1b3bc2ac99ccbd7f5678647

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SIDtoday

(U) Lost in the Open

FROM: [REDACTED]
Special Operational Support (S3092)
Run Date: 02/14/2005

Need to hide you NSA affiliation when making a call? Let your fingers do the walking -- without
"fingerprints" (C)

(U//FOUO) NSA is known throughout the world. "They" know where we work, the addresses of
our buildings and even our telephone numbers. So, how do we get lost in the open and perform
missions using non-secure communications?

(U//FOUO) Background: NSA owns a large non-secure telephone central office or C.O. This C.O.
provides dial tone and features to your non-secure telephone. NSA owns forty thousand
telephone numbers. Many are very well known. 301-688 is probably the most "famous" NSA
area-office code set. But, we also have 443-479, 240-373 and 410-854 numbers. These area-
office code sets are also becoming "famous." Making customer, vendor, and limited personal
calls from those NSA lines is not a problem, provided the calls are unclassified and you're not
trying to hide that you're calling from NSA.

(C) What do you do, though, if you have a mission requirement to hide or at least limit NSA
affiliation or to call overseas? Special Operational Support (S3092) can help establish
anonymity or cover telephones and assist getting International Direct Distance Dialing
(IDDD) access. Can't decide which mechanism you need? Here are some guidelines to follow.

  • Anonymity telephones limit access to NSA affiliation. Anonymity telephone lines are
    physically delivered to NSA from a vendor without using the NSA C.O. They have
    telephone numbers that are not "openly" affiliated with NSA. Caller I.D. for anonymity
    telephones typically shows the telephone number and either DoD or nothing at all for the
    name. Bills are usually sent to boxes owned by "DoD". Only examination of vendor-billing
    records will disclose affiliation with a physical NSA location. Anonymity telephones are to
    be used only for official government business that was coordinated with S3092.
  • Cover telephones hide NSA affiliation. Cover telephones are more complex. The
    telephone numbers are procured from various vendors using alias names and post office
    addresses. Caller I.D. reflects telephone number and alias name. Although cover
    telephones utilize the NSA C.O. they have no physical delivery address from a vendor and
    there is no "open" association with NSA. Due to the sensitive nature of cover telephones
    it is imperative that it is safeguarded to ensure access is limited to the personnel
    performing official government business / functions associated with the cover support
    plan established by S3092.
  • IDDD -- Policy states that NSA affiliates may use only cryptographically secure
    communications systems (e.g., STU III, STE, secure facsimiles, NSTS, etc.) when making
    calls to overseas locations. Anonymity and cover telephones do not fall under this policy
    for various reasons. S3092 is working with Security, the Groundbreaker PMO and Eagle
    Alliance to streamline the process for obtaining IDDD access for standard NSA
    telephones. For those that have an operational or administrative need to call overseas
    and NSA affiliation is not adversely affected, permission may be granted.

(C) S3092 provides training on the proper use of anonymity and cover telephone lines. We will
uniquely identify those telephones with a sticker similar to what is now present on the handset.

(U//FOUO) If you need assistance or have questions concerning installation, billing, and support
or maintenance procedures with any of the above mechanisms, please contact S3092
[REDACTED]).

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."

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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108