Korea IMT Holds 6th ROCK DRILL

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2004-07-09
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL

The sixth Korea rock drill raised the issue of information sharing on Korea issues to second parties and beyond. The scenarios addressed non-combatant evacuation operations, SIGINT in a counteroffensive to a North Korean attack, and operations in a newly unified Korea.

Long Description:
This SIDtoday article reports on the sixth ROCK DRILL exercise held in mid-June 2004 by the Korea Issue Management Team (KIMT), which for the first time included Second Party partners alongside the Extended Enterprise. The scenarios covered SIGINT responses to Non-combatant Evacuation Operations in Seoul and Pyongyang, tactical SIGINT in a counteroffensive to a North Korean attack, and Phase IV operations in a newly-unified Korea. The drill highlighted information-sharing gaps tied to the combined US-South Korean SIGINT partnership and the challenges of expanding sharing to Second Parties and other coalition members, with the KIMT planning to address these issues and exercise solutions in early 2005.
Programs:
-

People mentioned:
Miner, Tim, Brooks, Liz

Countries:
South Korea, North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Philippines, Colombia, Luxembourg, Australia, Canada, New Zealand

Tags:
Korea, rock drill, information sharing, non-combatant evacuation, coalition, second party

Identifier:
2004-07-09_SIDToday_-_Korea_IMT_Holds_6th_ROCK_DRILL

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SIDtoday

(S//SI) Korea IMT Holds 6th ROCK DRILL

FROM: the Korea IMT
Unknown
Run Date: 07/09/2004

(S//SI//REL) In mid-June, the Korea Issue Management Team (KIMT) held a ROCK DRILL that
included representatives from across the Extended Enterprise and from our Second Party
partners.

(S//SI//REL) For the first time, the KIMT addressed the SIGINT response to Non-combatant
Evacuation Operations (NEOs) in both Seoul and Pyongyang, eliciting a great deal of discussion
from both First and Second Party attendees. The next scenario addressed tactical SIGINT in a
counteroffensive responding to a North Korean attack and the final brainstorming session
concerned Phase IV operations in a newly-unified Korea. In all of these conversations, the
partners provided a unique perspective that energized the exchange and highlighted critical
gaps.

(S//SI//REL) Most important among these gaps was communications between and among the
US, Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Almost all of these difficulties are a direct
result of our agreements, policies and practices associated with the combined US-South Korean
(ROK) SIGINT partnership and, therefore, require creative thinking and/or policy changes to
resolve. For example, the current threat warning networks in the Korean Theater of Operations
(KTO) do not allow for Second Party access and most, if not all, computer networks in the KTO
are US-ROK or US only.

(S//SI//REL) Database access and Blue Forces data issues also figured prominently in
discussions. Lessons were drawn from our cooperation in other theaters, including Afghanistan
and Iraq. Finally, the Second Parties asked for permission to disseminate the new OPLANS to
their customers so that they can determine what their intelligence needs would be during a
Korean crisis - something about which most of the partners have, admittedly, not yet addressed
in any detail.

(S//SI//REL) Twenty-two nations, including the Five-Eyes community, have already signed the
still-extant 1950's-era U.N. resolution to defend South Korea if North Korea attacks. While many
sharing and cooperation issues exist with our Second Party partners, ROCK DRILL 6 made clear
that these issues will be magnified when it comes to sharing with other coalition partners, such
as the Philippines, Colombia and Luxembourg, to name a few. ROCK DRILL 6, therefore, was a
useful tool to raise the issue of intelligence sharing beyond the traditional US-ROK paradigm for
both Second Parties and others. Over the summer months, the KIMT will be working through
some of these problems, with the goal of exercising the resulting solutions sometime in early
2005.

(U//FOUO) If you have any questions, please feel free to contact:

  • LT [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] vc.di.nsa, NSTS [REDACTED]),
  • Tim Miner ([REDACTED]@nsa, NSTS[REDACTED]),
  • Liz Brooks ([REDACTED]@nsa, NSTS [REDACTED]) or
  • [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]@nsa, NSTS [REDACTED]),

...the NK IMT.

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."

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