Pattern and Social Network Analysis

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2003-08-20
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: SECRET SI
Dissemination: -

Article describes social network analysis (who actually communicates with whom, which may be different from formal hierarchies) and pattern analysis (looking at patterns of behavior to find unknown targets). It says conventional wisdom that terrorists operate in isolated cells was wrong in the case of Abu Zubaida and claims most of the 9/11 hijackers were not known to the intelligence community.

Long Description:
This SIDtoday article, part of an Analysis series, describes two analytic methodologies: Social Network Analysis (SNA), which identifies who actually communicates with whom and reveals influential individuals beyond official hierarchies, and Pattern Analysis, which models behaviors to identify unknown targets. It cites SNA conducted against terrorist Abu Zubaida's network showing 300 interconnected terrorists, contradicting the conventional wisdom that terrorist groups operate in isolated cells. It also describes the Counterterrorism Strategic Intelligence and Operations Center's Terrorist Threat Pattern Analysis Model developed after analyzing the 9/11 attacks, noting most hijackers were not known to intelligence services.
Programs:
FOLLOWTHEPEOPLE

People mentioned:
Zubaydah, Abu

Countries:
-

Tags:
social network analysis, pattern analysis, counterterrorism, Al-Qaeda, analysis

Identifier:
2003-08-20_SIDToday_-_Pattern_and_Social_Network_Analysis

PDF SHA-256:
753cfe2e4abd2271b68c3fac9c16e9a60d1e749daca51e661cab3d71ea8fcdc1

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SIDtoday

(C) Pattern and Social Network Analysis

FROM: [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
Unknown
Run Date: 08/20/2003

(C) As analysts, you know that all data sets and intelligence needs
are not created equal; consequently there is no "one-methodology-
fits-all" approach to apply to SIGINT problems. It's very
challenging to know when to apply different methodologies to
achieve the results we need. Social Network Analysis (SNA) and
Pattern Analysis are analytic methodologies that have been
successful against counterterrorism targets and may likely prove
successful in pursuing other targets.

(C) Social Network Analysis

(C) As a practical example, when you want to influence your boss's
decision on an important matter, how and through whom do you
relay your point of view? Based on your own SNA of the workplace,
you will contact the person in the best position to influence your
boss and you'll communicate via the mode that you consider most
effective. Your target works that way too, and the better you
understand the structure of the social networks, the better your
chances of finding weaknesses that can be leveraged for SIGINT
advantage.

(S//SI) SNA can help you identify people who, although they may
not be significant in the "official" leadership hierarchy, have
influential personal ties to people in high places. This is possible
because SNA consolidates large volumes of current SIGINT
reporting to provide a bird's eye view of a network and how it is
connected. SNA conducted against two years' worth of SIGINT data
on terrorist Abu Zubaida and his network showed a highly
interconnected group of 300 terrorists who were still largely
connected even after Zubaida was arrested and removed from the
picture. This stands in sharp contrast to open source "conventional
wisdom" which holds that terrorist organizations are structured
into isolated cells, where most of the people have little knowledge
of or contact with others.

(C) Pattern Analysis

(S//SI) How can NSA help find the al-Qa'ida terrorists who may
soon carry out an attack in the U.S., without knowing their names
or anything else about them? One answer is the Terrorist Threat
Pattern Analysis Model developed by the Counterterrorism
Strategic Intelligence and Operations Center (SIOC). CT SIOC
thoroughly analyzed the calamitous events of 11 September 2001
(and the events leading up to it) to try to stop such an event from
occurring again. That analysis revealed that most of the September
11th hijackers were not known to intelligence services throughout
the world and, therefore, did not draw the attention of those
services. Without knowing in advance that these people were
terrorists, and with no names, passport numbers, or other
identifying information, the Intelligence Community could not track
them. Pattern analysis helps us defeat such a foe. By determining

SERIES:
(U) Analysis

  1. Strengthening Our Analytic Capability
  2. Active Analysis: SIGINT That Can Predict
  3. Pattern and Social Network Analysis
  4. Analysis Series: Follow the People and Geospatial Exploitation
  5. Deep Target Knowledge
  6. Analysis Series Wrap-up: Continuous Learning

the way in which the terrorists traveled, received finances,
obtained identifications, and carried out operational activities, it
was possible to develop a model of their operational patterns. By
converting that model into algorithms and running those algorithms
against SIGINT, NSA hopes to identify potential terrorists base on
their patterns of activity before they are able to carry out their
attacks.

(U) Conclusion

(C) So, if you don't know exactly who your target is, but he
repeats his methods of operations, pattern analysis may help you
find him. Likewise, if you want to uncover people or ascertain their
significance and role in your target network, you might want to try
SNA. Hopefully, we've given you some food for thought so you can
begin to look at your target in a different way and consider
employing these methodologies to your SIGINT advantage. The CT
SIOC stands ready to provide more specifics on Pattern Analysis,
and the Social Network Analysis Workcenter ("go sna") is poised to
consider your target for study.

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."

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TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108