Introduction to the Korean Issue Management Team

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2003-05-20
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 1
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: SECRET SI
Dissemination: -

The Korean Issue Management Team identifies North Korean SIGINT gaps, prioritizes them, and challenges the enterprise to respond with solutions.

Long Description:
The Korean Issue Management Team (KIMT) was formed in February 2003 to identify North Korean SIGINT gaps, prioritize them, and challenge the enterprise to respond with solutions. The team includes members from Customer Relationships, Analysis and Production, and Data Acquisition, operating under the SID Director's authority. KIMT briefed the NSA/CSS Long Term SIGINT Strategy against North Korea at a SIGINT Enterprise Quarterly Executive Leadership Conference and completed an analysis of Priority-1 North Korean Information Needs. The team is coordinating a Multi-INT Review with Intelligence Community partners and planning a series of North Korea Rock-Drills to optimize cryptologic planning activities.
Programs:
-

People mentioned:
Fleisch, Fran

Countries:
North Korea, Iraq

Tags:
intelligence gaps, issue management, cryptology, intelligence community, multi-int, information needs, planning, enterprise leadership

Identifier:
2003-05-20_SIDToday_-_Introduction_to_the_Korean_Issue_Management_Team

PDF SHA-256:
c6e743ebc435968a94738b4c7cea5f9a0985d786f31f0745673068e61c24c71b

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SIDtoday

(U//FOUO) Introduction to the Korean Issue Management Team

FROM: the Korean Issue Management Team
Unknown
Run Date: 05/20/2003

(U//FOUO) This past November the SID Director introduced you to the "Issue Manager Team" construct. In February 2003, the "Korean Issue Management Team" (KIMT) was formed and consists of members from Customer Relationships [REDACTED]), Analysis and Production (Fran Fleish), and Data Acquisition ([REDACTED]). The KIMT is established to identify North Korean SIGINT gaps, prioritize them, and challenge the enterprise to respond with solutions. The KIMT's objective is to "bind the bubbles" with the SID Director's authority to leverage people and resources in a quiet way to get their job done. Our goal is to transform how we do business, optimize our resources and provide increased value to our customers. Because KIMT's potential is so great for the Enterprise, we want to keep you updated on our progress.

(S//SI) On 11 March, the KIMT briefed the NSA/CSS Long Term SIGINT Strategy against North Korea to the 2nd Qtr/FY03 SIGINT Enterprise Quarterly Executive Leadership Conference held at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. As a result of the brief, the KIMT was tasked to use the six SID Operating Principles to conduct an analysis of the Priority-1 NK Information Needs (INs). This effort was completed and briefed to the SID Executive Leadership Board (ELB) on 16 April. The Team is currently completing an assessment of the Priority-2 NK INs, which combined with the Priority-1 INs, will account for approximately 75% of all NK INs.

(S//SI) A lesson learned from the Iraq IMT was that we are increasingly working intelligence issues that do not correlate to any one Intelligence Community (IC) organization. Additionally, we discovered that seamless work across the entire Enterprise is critical to bridging the threat-based and capability-based SIGINT system. To be effective, we must plan meticulously to produce SIGINT with an unwavering focus for our customer needs. Therefore, the KIMT is coordinating a Multi-INT Review, with other Intelligence Community partners, to map customer key decisions/interests on NK, to stated customer INs and then determine which IC Agency has the lead for each IN. Additionally, the KIMT is planning a series of NK Rock-Drills in the June-July timeframe. The first Rock-Drill will focus on coordinating, at the working level, short and mid-term cryptologic planning activities on NK. This effort will include organizations throughout the Enterprise, to include Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE's), key customers and other IC partners. The second Drill will facilitate senior-level discussions on the Multi-INT Review and a wrap-up of the first NK Rock-Drill.

(S//SI) We expect the results of these activities to optimize our overall capability against NK, providing the best possible SIGINT support to our customers. This effort is all about integrated planning and disciplined execution across the Enterprise. You'll be hearing more about the Multi-INT Review and NK Rock Drills so stay tuned!

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."

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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108